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Executive Summary 
 
 
 
Norad commissioned this study as an 
input to their assessment of SADC and 
planning of future Norwegian 
assistance to regional co-operation in 
Southern Africa. The report is based 
on field visits in October-November 
2001 to the SADC Secretariat and six 
Southern African countries. The team 
interviewed nearly 70 senior officials 
and other stakeholders and consulted a 
wide range of written documentation.   
 
I 
 
By the mid-1990s it was becoming 
clear that SADC was experiencing 
major difficulties and constraints. It 
was felt that the SADC Secretariat 
lacked the power, authority and 
resources required to facilitate 
regional integration. The sector co-
ordinating units in member states were 
highly uneven in their ability to pursue 
and implement policies. It was also 
argued that SADC’s work plan lacked 
a clear regional focus, it covered too 
many areas, and the majority of 
projects were found to be mainly 
national. 
 
 
 
 
 
SADC was also highly dependent on 
external donor finance. The region’s 
own resources, including the private 
sector, were insufficiently mobilised 
for the implementation of SADC 
projects and activities. Furthermore, 
SADC was characterised by growing 
political divisions and a failure to 
address governance, peace and 
security issues. 
 
A high-powered SADC team submitted 
a comprehensive Report on the Review 
of Operations of SADC Institutions in 
2000. It recommended far-reaching 
changes in SADC’s organisational 
structure, way of operations and policy 
focus. The report was approved at an 
extraordinary SADC Summit in March 
2001. The August 2001 Summit further 
consolidated these decisions and 
amended the SADC Treaty to take 
account of the institutional changes. 
 
 
II 
 
The institutional reforms revolve 
around the changing role and 
functions of the SADC Secretariat. 
SADC’s sector co-ordinating units and 
commissions will be phased out and 
their functions moved to the 
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Secretariat. Four directorates will be 
established to take over the 
responsibilities. The process is 
scheduled to take two years and began 
with the Summit decisions in March 
2001|. A Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan is expected to be 
available by mid-2002. It is intended to 
provide an operationalisation of 
SADC’s objectives. This includes 
shifting the focus of the Secretariat 
from project management to policy 
formulation and harmonisation, and 
resource mobilisation. 
 
The August 2001 Summit also brought 
the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security firmly under SADC 
control. An elaborate structure was 
adopted and it was decided to let the 
Secretariat also act as the secretariat 
for the Organ. A number of issues 
regarding the structure and operations 
of the Organ still have to be clarified. 
 
The new SADC structure also includes 
a national committee in each member 
country. These committees are 
intended to be crucial in ensuring 
national ownership of the SADC 
project, in formulating national inputs 
to SADC and in implementing SADC 
policies at the national level. 
 
The decisions regarding institutional 
reform also emphasise the role of non-
state actors, especially non-
governmental organisations and 
business. At all levels of the 
organisation, from regional governing 
structures to national committees, 
these stakeholders are to be involved. 
 
This study concludes that the 
institutional reforms are major and 
significant attempts to address the 
weaknesses associated with the old 
SADC structure. All officials in 
member countries and other 
stakeholders interviewed by the study 
team supported the restructuring and 
were eager to see it work. However, 
there was uncertainty about the 
specifics of the institutional reforms, 
especially related to the closing down 
of sector co-ordinating units and 
commissions. 
 
The team made a number of 
observations. One is that SADC in 
implementing the institutional reforms 
seems to have started with the 
organisational structure of the 
institution while the outlining of the 
specific functions of the organisational 
components, as well as the policies and 
work plans, are not yet available. One 
would have hoped that work plans and 
strategies would have been in place 
before major reorganisations of the 
Secretariat took place.  
 
The team also noted that there are 
several uncertainties around the move 
to a more centralised and stronger 
Secretariat. Who will take care of the 
management and implementation of 
regional projects under the new 
structure? Another concern is capacity 
constraints. The management of 
complex regional co-operation efforts 
requires the availability of a pool of 
political and technical experts. Such 
expertise is scarce in the region. 
Furthermore, there are a host of 
practical problems and obstacles, 
which may slow down or hamper the 
restructuring. 
 
There are no easy solutions to these 
problems. They underline the 
importance of a sharp focus and 
prioritisation of scarce resources. 
They also serve to underline the 
importance of speedy implementation 
of the organisational changes. Delays 
seem unavoidable, but if the 
restructuring is drawn out it may 
impact negatively on implementation 
and delivery. 
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SADC has a poor record in mobilising 
the region’s own resources. This is 
recognised by the organisation. A first 
effort to improve resource mobilisation 
is the introduction of a new formula 
for membership fees and contributions. 
This is intended to make the running of 
SADC institutions independent of 
donor finance. However, SADC failed 
to reach agreement on a new formula 
at the August 2001 meeting of the 
Council of Ministers. It is however, 
expected that SADC will be able to 
reach an agreement on this.      
 
III 
 
The organisational challenges can be 
overcome. The main objective of the 
institutional reforms is to make SADC 
a more efficient and relevant 
organisation. The report makes a 
number of findings and observations. 
This is also based on case studies of 
SADC’s work in the field of trade, 
energy and water as well as the 
organisation’s role in promoting 
democratisation, governance, peace 
and security. The report also 
specifically discusses the role of South 
Africa and the new Nepad initiative as 
well as the challenges represented by 
the existence of overlapping economic 
integration efforts. 
 
Member countries appear to be 
supporting not only the institutional 
restructuring, but also SADC’s efforts 
to develop and harmonise policies in a 
number of sectors. It is significant that 
SADC has been in position to make 
progress in several policy areas 
despite the persistence of political 
divisions in the Southern African 
region. The cleavages in the region 
appear to be crosscutting; countries 
taking similar position in one area 
(e.g. trade) may be opposing each 
other in other policy areas (e.g. 
security issues).  
 
Still, the obstacles ahead are 
significant. In particular the report 
highlights the importance of ensuring 
that all member countries benefit from 
the membership. This assumes a 
particular importance in a region as 
diverse as Southern Africa. The gains 
from increased regional co-operation 
must be widely spread in order to 
ensure that everybody remain 
committed to regionalisation. SADC 
must therefore continuously monitor 
the distribution of benefits of 
integration. The report notes that this 
has received limited attention in the 
current discussion and planning of 
policy harmonisation and institutional 
reform. 
 
SADC’s efforts to promote regional 
integration will not succeed only on 
perceptions of economic costs and 
benefits in individual member 
countries. Political will and 
commitment will in the final analysis 
determine whether regional integration 
is embarked upon with serious intent. 
SADC’s efforts must bring with it not 
only the prospects of economic 
prosperity but also of security and 
stability. 
 
The report emphasises that SADC 
needs to develop a focused approach 
to its development strategy and 
programme of action with an 
identification of targeted priorities for 
the medium term. Scarce resources 
must be prioritised in order to ensure 
that SADC shall be in position to 
deliver. SADC’s Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan is 
important for the future success in 
delivery and creation of a common 
understanding of SADC’s role. 
 
 x 
The report notes that South Africa’s 
role is crucial for advancing regional 
co-operation. South Africa must take a 
leading role in this process, contribute 
resources required to make it work, 
and do so in a manner that does not 
increase tensions and divisions in the 
region. The utilisation of the South 
African government’s African 
Renaissance Fund, the development of 
Nepad and South Africa’s ability to 
play a role in facilitating 
democratisation and conflict 
management will be important 
indications of South Africa’s 
commitment and capacity to promote 
regional co-operation in the region. 
 
The study also notes that there is a 
number of overlapping regional 
integration efforts in Southern Africa. 
This is becoming more problematic 
with SADC’s move to economic 
integration and away from project co-
ordination. Whereas overlaps in 
project co-operation may entail waste 
of administrative resources, unclear 
and overlapping rules in the areas of 
trade may retard economic progress. 
The relation between SADC and 
Comesa is the most challenging and 
difficult one. 
 
The report concludes by calling for 
cautious optimism. SADC should not 
be expected to make rapid progress in 
implementation and delivery in the 
short term. Progress will rather be an 
incremental process that will require 
time and astute management. Nor 
should we expect that all 14 SADC 
member countries should progress in 
union towards a common goal. 
Regional co-operation will also be 
enhanced and promoted trough a 
number of channels and institutions, 
both outside and inside SADC. It is 
also likely that some member countries 
will move more swiftly than others will 
and that the future evolution of SADC 
will be characterised by what is 
sometimes referred to as variable 
geometry and variable speed.  
 
IV 
 
Norway has historically been a firm 
political and financial supporter of 
SADC. However, the co-operation 
began to falter in the first half of the 
1990s. In the late 1990s Norway began 
to devise a new approach and 
operational guidelines for assistance 
to regional co-operation and 
integration. The guidelines emphasise 
support to regional activities 
prioritising economic and political 
reform, contribution to peace and 
conflict management, and facilitation 
of increased economic integration and 
intra-regional trade. 
 
In early 2001 NORAD adopted 
guidelines for regional assistance to 
the SADC-region. In these guidelines 
economic development; energy; 
environment and natural resource 
management; peace, human rights and 
democracy; social sector; and culture 
were emphasised as priority areas for 
assistance to regional development. A 
more focused programme will be 
developed for assistance to SADC. As 
a first step NORAD made NOK 10 
million available to the SADC 
Secretariat in 2001-2002. This was 
intended as a contribution to the costs 
of implementing institutional reform.  
 
The first main recommendation for 
Norway’s support to SADC is that 
NORAD must continue to be prepared 
for flexibility and short-term assistance 
in its support. NORAD must provide 
continued support to institutional 
restructuring of SADC to ensure that 
the process is completed speedily and 
with a minimum of disruption to the 
implementation of programmes and 
projects. 
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A second recommendation is that 
NORAD must build capacity for 
monitoring and analysis. Pursuing 
regional co-operation in Southern 
Africa is multifaceted and challenging. 
It must encompass a range of different 
sectors, institutional reforms and 
capacity constraints, and sensitive 
political issues. An aid agency must 
have the capacity to monitor the co-
operation and integration process and 
the activities of the wide range of 
actors involved. It must also be in a 
position to assess and analyse the 
implications of the unfolding events 
and processes. 
 
The study team also makes 
recommendations for Norwegian 
assistance in the medium to long-term. 
Norwegian support should focus on 
SADC’s core area of operations. Other 
areas may be supported at the national 
level or through other regional 
organisations or networks. Norway 
should also prioritise those sectors 
where it has the skills and resources 
required to make a strong 
contribution, and where the sector is 
also assisted through country 
programmes in the region. 
 
Norway should follow closely SADC’s 
efforts to facilitate conflict resolution 
and political stability. Norwegian 
support to these areas is significant in 
quantitative terms, but it is largely ad 
hoc, uncoordinated and seemingly with 
little attention to what takes place at 
the regional level under the auspices of 
SADC and associated institutions. 
However, the report recommends that 
a significant share of funding for such 
purposes still may have to be 
channelled outside official channels. 
 
The report notes that South Africa’s 
resources, institutional strengths and 
capacities are critical for the progress 
and achievements of SADC.  These 
resources must be used within a 
capacity-building context. It is 
important to avoid a situation where 
South Africa’s domination may lead to 
deterioration in intra-regional 
relations with detrimental effect on 
regional co-operation. This must also 
guide Norwegian support and co-
operation with South Africa. 
 
Finally, the report recommends that 
Norway in its bilateral assistance to 
individual SADC member countries 
support projects and programmes that 
build institutional capacities enabling 
the country to take part in and benefit 
from regional co-operation. 
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1: SADC  - The Need for Change 
 
 
Originally known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC), the organisation was formed in Lusaka, Zambia in 1980.1 Its chief 
objectives were to mobilise and co-ordinate development assistance; facilitate 
regional co-operation through joint development projects, especially in infrastructure 
such as transport and communications; and to reduce the dependence on apartheid 
South Africa.2 Significantly, the SADCC gave post-independence southern African 
governments their first platform for regional economic co-operation. 
 
SADCC was formed as a rather loose form of co-operation built on concrete projects 
and programmes. A limited number of institutions was established and formalised 
according to a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1981. In the late 1980s 
regional policy-makers identified a need for a more effective organisation, with legal 
status and powers. They were also increasingly confident that South Africa was 
moving towards democracy. Accordingly, they decided to formalise SADCC and to 
shift its focus from mere co-operation among member countries to more far-reaching 
regional integration. 
 
After four years of preparatory work, regional heads of state signed a Declaration and 
Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 
Windhoek, Namibia in 1992. Namibia and South Africa became members in 1990 and 
1994, respectively, and later Mauritius, the Seychelles and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo also joined the new Community. 
                                                     
1 The founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.   
2 Cf. the overview and analysis of the history of SADCC in I. Mandaza & A. Tostensen, Southern 
Africa in search of a common future: From the Conference to the Community, Gaborone: SADC 1994, 
and K. Lambrechts, “The SADC’s Origins”, pp- 17-28 in The IGD Guide to the Southern African 
Development Community, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue 2001. 
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SADC’s objectives or Common Agenda as outlined in the 1992 Treaty revolves 
around 
 
• Promoting development, poverty reduction and economic growth 
through regional integration; 
• Consolidating, defending and maintaining democracy, peace, security 
and stability; 
• Promoting common political values and institutions which are 
democratic, legitimate and effective; 
• Strengthening of links among the people of the region; and  
• Mobilisation of regional and international private and public resources 
for the development of the region.  
 
The decentralised nature of the Co-ordination Conference was continued with the new 
SADC. Each member state was allocated the responsibility for co-ordinating one or 
more sectors. This involved proposing policies, strategies and priorities, and 
processing projects for inclusion in the sector programme, monitoring progress and 
reporting to the Council of Ministers. Today there are 21 sector co-ordinating units 
and commissions in 12 of the 14 SADC countries. Commissions, assisted by 
commission secretariats, are regional institutions, approved by Summit and supported 
by all member states. The secretariats have a regional staff and are funded directly by 
member states through separate contributions. The sector co-ordinating units are 
national institutions established in the appropriate line ministry by the member 
country responsible for co-ordinating the particular sector and staffed by civil servants 
of the particular country. They are guided by sectoral committees of ministers. Only 
DRC and the Seychelles are without sector responsibilities. Cf. the presentation in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: SADC’s sector co-ordinators (July 2001) 
 
 
Angola 
Botswana 
 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Energy Commission 
Agricultural Research and Training; Livestock 
Production and Animal Disease Control 
Environment and Land Management; Water 
Inland Fisheries; Forestry; Wildlife  
Tourism 
Culture, Information and Sport; Transport and 
Communication Commission 
Marine Fisheries; Legal Affairs 
Finance and Investment; Health 
Human Resources Development 
Industry and Trade 
Employment and Labour; Mining 
Crop Production; Food, Agriculture and Natural 
Resources 
 
 Note: The responsibility for the gender unit is located at the SADC Secretariat 
 
SADC has aimed at developing common approaches and policies through protocols. 
A protocol is a legal instrument that commits member states to co-operate, co-
ordinate, harmonise and integrate policies and strategies in one or more sectors. 
 3 
Sectoral actors in collaboration with SADC agencies develop protocols. Next, they 
are scrutinised by SADC’s legal sector before being submitted to the Council of 
Ministers for approval. Following this, they need to be signed by the Summit of 
Heads of State or Government. Finally, after being signed, they need to be ratified by 
two thirds of member states – typically in a parliamentary process – before coming 
into force. So far 20 protocols have been signed and eight have been ratified and 
entered into force.3 Cf. also Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2: SADC protocols signed and ratified 
 
 Protocol Date of signature Ratified 
1 Immunities and privileges 1992, August x 
2 Shared watercourse systems 1995, August x 
3 Transport, communication and meteorology 1996, August x 
4 Energy 1996, August x 
5 Combating illicit drug trafficking 1996, August x 
6 Trade 1996, August x 
7 Education and training 1997, September x 
8 Mining 1997, September x 
9 Tourism 1998, September x 
10 Wildlife conservation and law enforcement 1999, August  
11 Health 1999, August  
12 Tribunal and the rules of procedure 2000, August  
13 Legal affairs 2000, August  
14 Revised protocol on shared watercourses 2000, August  
15 Amendment protocol on trade 2000, August  
16 Politics, defence and security co-operation 2001, August  
17 Control of firearms, ammunition and other related materials 2001, August  
18  Fisheries 2001, August  
19 Corruption 2001, August  
20 Culture, information and sport 2001, August  
 
Source: Derived from information prepared for the Council of Ministers meeting in 
August 2001 
 
SADC’s Programme of Action now covers about 470 projects. SADC itself estimates 
that most of these, about 80 percent, have a strong national character and should have 
been implemented under the national programmes of member states. Only 20 percent 
of the present project portfolio would meet the criteria of being properly regional 
projects. 
 
As SADC moved into the latter half of the 1990s critical questions began to emerge 
about the organisations ability to promote regional co-operation and integration. 
SADC appointed a team of consultants, which submitted its Review and 
Rationalisation study in 1997.4 This study recommended that the sector co-ordinating 
units and commissions be phased out and brought together in five planning and co-
ordination directorates as follows: 
 
                                                     
3 Cf. part 4 and 5 in The IGD Guide to the Southern African Development Community (op.cit.) for a 
presentation of the protocols and work plans of each of sector co-ordinating units and commissions.  
4 C. Chipeta: Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action, Vol. I (Executive Report) 
and II (Main Report), CSIR and Imani 1997. 
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1. Human resource development, science and technology; 
2. Agriculture, natural resources and environment; 
3. Infrastructure, communication and information technology; 
4. Trade, industry, investment and finance; and 
5. Community development, culture and information. 
 
However, SADC failed to reach agreement on the proposed restructuring, in part 
because of opposition from some member countries reluctant to close down their co-
ordinating units and increasing the power of the Secretariat. 
 
SADC had recorded important achievements, particularly in areas of infrastructural 
development and in fostering a sense of regional belonging. However, its difficulties 
continued to deepen. Growing political divisions over the conflict in SADC’s newest 
member, the DRC, exacerbated it. SADC remained divided and failed to reach 
agreement about the role of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, 
an institution established in 1996. 
 
At the end of the last decade, the main difficulties and constraints identified in SADC 
documents and by analysts usually included5: 
 
• The SADC Secretariat in Gaborone lacked the power, authority and 
resources required to facilitate regional integration;  
• The sector co-ordinating units in the member states were highly uneven 
in their ability to pursue and implement policies; 
• SADC’s Programme of Action lacked a clear regional focus, it covered 
too many areas, and the majority of projects were mainly national; 
• Limited capacity to mobilise the region’s own resources, including the 
private sector, for the implementation of the Programme of Action and 
an over-dependence on external financial resources; and 
• Growing political divisions within SADC and a failure to address 
governance, peace and security issues. 
 
Senior officials in the SADC Secretariat also increasingly expressed this. The then 
acting executive secretary in the Secretariat, Prega Ramsamy, in a speech in delivered 
in June 2000 identified two critical issues for the organisation. The first was the 
inability of its present structure to adapt to changing circumstances and new 
challenges. The second was the need for a more focused approach with targeted 
priorities for the next 10-15 years.6 
 
The SADC Heads of State and Government returned to the 1997 study at its 1999 
Summit. It directed the SADC Council of Ministers to initiate a comprehensive 
review of the operations of SADC institutions, including the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation. The Review Committee, composed of 
representatives from Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
                                                     
5 In addition to the literature cited mention should also be made of the discussion of these issues in 
SAPES, UNDP & SADC: SADC Regional Human Development Report 2000. Challenges and 
Opportunities for Regional Development, Harare: SAPES Books 2000 and C. Clapham et al. (eds.): 
Regional Integration in Southern Africa. Comparative International Perspectives, Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of International Affairs 2001. 
6 See P. Ramsamy, “SADC: The Way Forward”, pp. 33-41 in C. Clapham et al. (eds.) op.cit. 
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produced a comprehensive Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions 
in 2000. 
 
Three important meetings dedicated to the restructuring exercise were then held. The 
first was the extraordinary meeting of Council in Gaborone in November 2000. The 
second was another extraordinary meeting of the Council in Windhoek in March 2001 
followed by the Extra-Ordinary Summit in Windhoek on 9 March to approve the 
Report. This will be discussed in the next chapter.    
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2: Institutional reform  – assessing the new SADC 
 
 
In March 2001, an extraordinary SADC Summit approved the proposed 
recommendations for far-reaching changes in SADC’s institutional framework and 
the structure for executing its 1992 mandate. These included changes in SADC’s 
governing structures at the regional and national level, but most importantly a plan for 
the abolishment of the 21 sector co-ordinating units and commissions located in 12 of 
its member countries. These units will, according to the approved plan, be brought 
together in four clusters in a strengthened SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. The 
intention is to implement these changes over a period of two years, beginning in 
March 2001. 
 
At the Council of Ministers Meeting and Summit in Blantyre in August 2001 these 
changes in SADC structures were further consolidated. The SADC Treaty was 
amended to take into account these institutional changes. In addition the Summit 
signed a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation which provided for 
an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation under the SADC Summit. 
The Organ has its own set of regional structures and mechanisms for policy 
formulation and implementation but the protocol also specifies that the SADC 
Secretariat shall be the Secretariat of the Organ. 
 
The implementation of the changes is overseen and guided by a Review Committee. 
This committee was appointed by the Council of Ministers in 1999 and is composed 
of Ministers and senior officials from several member countries. Its report on the 
operations of SADC institutions, which provided the basis for the decisions at the 
Windhoek Summit, was published in April 2001.  
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This chapter provides an outline of each of the main elements of the new institutional 
reforms and an assessment of the implementation. It also seeks to identify main 
achievements and bottlenecks.1 
 
2.1 Governing Structures 
 
The Summit is the supreme policy-making institution of SADC. It is led by a Troika 
system consisting of the Chairperson, Incoming Chairperson and the Outgoing 
Chairperson. It will, according to the new Treaty, meet at least twice a year (under the 
previous arrangement it normally only met once a year). The first meeting will take 
place before 31 March each year and is intended to focus primarily on regional 
economic development matters and the SADC Programme of Action. The second will 
take place in August/September and is dedicated to political matters. Decisions will 
be taken by consensus and will be binding. 
 
The Blantyre Summit also established an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-
operation. It also operates on a Troika basis. The Troika members are selected by the 
Summit from among the members of the Summit except that the Chairperson of the 
Troika cannot at the same time have the Chair of the Summit. Under the Organ a 
Ministerial Committee shall be established consisting of the Ministers responsible for 
foreign affairs, defence, public security or state security. See more on the Organ in 
section 2.3 below. 
 
The Council of Ministers, which oversees the functioning of SADC, will meet at least 
four times year. It consists of one Minister from each member state, preferably the 
Minister responsible for the SADC National Contact Point. The National Contact 
Point is either the Ministry of Finance/Development Planning or, in most and in an 
expected growing number of countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
The Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) is, apart from the Organ, the main 
innovation in the governing structure of SADC. It will oversee the implementation of 
the core areas of integration, which include the four clusters (see below) and provide 
policy guidance to the Secretariat. The ICM has decision-making powers to ensure 
rapid implementation of programmes. According to the Treaty it shall however, only 
meet at least twice a year and consist of at least two ministers from each country. 
There are no guidelines and no indications of which those Ministers should be. They 
may vary depending on the items on the agenda and the concerns of the member 
states. The ICM can also appoint subcommittees of ministers when need arises. They 
may be constituted at cluster level and be serviced by the relevant Secretariat 
directorate. A standing committee of officials providing technical advice assists the 
ICM. It consists of one permanent secretary or an official of equivalent rank from 
each Member State. 
 
ICM will replace the Sectoral Committees of Ministers which, however, will continue 
to meet until ICM has been properly established. 
                                                     
1 This information in this chapter is unless otherwise stated derived from the restructuring study Report 
on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions March 2001 (n.p. (Gaborone): n.p. (SADC 
Secretariat) April 2001), documents and statements from the August 2001 Council of Ministers 
meeting and Summit, including the amended Treaty, and interviews conducted by the team.    
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The team did note some uncertainties concerning the function of the ICM. Some felt it 
would simply be an expanded duplication of the Council of Ministers. Others saw it 
as primarily an instrument set up to supervise the formulation and implementation of 
the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (see below). One option indicated 
to the team was to set up the ICM with four Sectoral Committee of Ministers 
corresponding to each of the four directorates. It was also felt by some that powers of 
the ICM (and also the Council of Ministers) could be delegated to the Executive 
Secretary. 
 
           Fig. 1: The new SADC structure 
 
 
 
The organogramme of the SADC structure is presented in fig. 1 
 
The SADC Treaty is legally binding on members, and provides for sanctions against 
member states that fail to fulfil their obligations, or implement policies that 
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undermine its principles and objectives. Tribunals shall be constituted to ensure 
adherence to and proper interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty, and to 
adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it. The protocol (signed in August 
2000) prescribing the composition, powers, functions, procedures and other related 
matters governing the Tribunal, is not yet ratified. No Tribunal has yet been 
appointed.  
 
2.2. The Secretariat 
 
Most of the institutional reforms revolve around the changing role and functions of 
the Secretariat in Gaborone. The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of 
SADC and the reforms intend to give it the power and authority to shape the form and 
content of the regional programme and be more effective in implementing it. The 
institutional reforms are also intended to ensure a more cost efficient and cheaper 
regional organisation. The Secretariat shall inter alia 
 
• be responsible for strategic planning and management; 
• implement decisions of the governing structures, including the 
Organ; 
• co-ordinate and harmonise policies and strategies of member states; 
• monitor and evaluate the implementation of regional policies and 
programmes; 
• ensure gender mainstreaming in all programmes and projects; 
• mobilise resources and co-ordinate programmes and projects with 
donors and co-operating partners; and 
• do research on community building and the integration process. 
 
The 21 sector co-ordinating units and commissions will be closed down. Their 
activities will be moved to the Secretariat in Gaborone. The process began in March 
2001 and shall, according to the plan, be completed over a period of two years. Four 
directorates will replace the sector co-ordinating units and commissions. The first, the 
Directorate on Trade, Industry, Finance, Investment and Mining, was launched in 
August 2001 replacing the sector co-ordinating units on trade in industry (in 
Tanzania), finance and investment (South Africa), and mining (Zambia). As a 
temporary measure member countries have been requested to second personnel to the 
Secretariat. Member countries contribute their local salaries to the seconded persons 
while additional costs are covered by the Secretariat. Following a so-called job 
evaluation study (see below) and the finalisation of the transfer of functions from 
member countries it is expected that the Secretariat will appoint staff on a contract 
basis. 
 
An organogramme of the new Secretariat is provided in fig. 2. 
 
A job evaluation study to be undertaken will also provide answers to inter alia the 
staff requirements and grading, specific functions and modes of operation of the 
different units within the Secretariat. At the Secretariat it was expected that the study 
would be available by the end of the year and provide further clarity regarding the 
organisation of the new Secretariat. It was originally envisaged that this study should 
be undertaken by external consultants, but following the Blantyre meeting of the 
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Council of Ministers in August it was decided that the Secretariat itself should play a 
stronger role in the preparation of this study. 
 
An audit of SADC Assets in member countries is also to be undertaken as a 
preparation of the transfer of staff and resources to Gaborone. It had not yet been 
undertaken at the time of the team’s visit. 
 
The Secretariat has also started the preparations of a Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP) to provide an operationalisation of SADC’s objectives. 
The Plan is expected to emphasise the shift from a focus on project implementation to 
a focus on policy formulation and harmonisation. The RISDP shall, according to the 
plan, be completed by June 2002 (see more in Ch. 3.1).   
 
 
 Fig. 2: The structure of the new SADC Secretariat 
 
 
 
 
 
The current costs of running the SADC institutions (Secretariat, Commissions and 
Sector Co-ordinating units) is, according to the March 2001 report from the Review 
Committee, about USD 16 million based on a total staff of 194 professionals and 190 
support staff. The new structure, based on a minimum staff complement of 94 
professionals and 40 support staff, is estimated in the same report to cost about USD 
12 million. The staff requirement may, in the view of this team, be significantly 
higher than envisaged in this document. The immediate cost savings may not 
necessarily materialise. The cost of maintaining staff in Gaborone may also be higher 
than envisaged in the report. Under the old structure a significant part of the costs 
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were also in local currencies (salaries for civil service working in the co-ordinating 
units). With the new Secretariat most expenses will be in foreign currency. 
 
2.2.1 The Executive Secretary and the Department of Strategic Planning, Gender 
and Policy Harmonisation 
 
The amended Treaty does not provide for an increase in the formal powers and 
authority of the Executive Secretary in relation to the governing structures of the 
institution. His office has however, been strengthened, inter alia through the 
establishment of a position of a Deputy Executive Secretary. The Deputy, a Zambian 
national, was appointed at Blantyre and has taken up his position.  
 
The Executive Secretary’s office will also provide the support services for the smooth 
operation of the Secretariat. The requirements will increase dramatically. The 
forthcoming job evaluation study is expected to provide further clarity regarding 
needs and positions to be filled. 
 
The Department of Strategic Planning, Gender and Policy Harmonisation is a new 
Department set up to strengthen the Secretariat in executing its new functions, 
particularly strategic planning, gender mainstreaming, management and 
harmonisation of polices. A Chief Director heads the Department. A South African 
national took up this position in October. 
 
A major urgent task for this Department is the preparation of the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Plan and – presumably in consultation with the job evaluation study – the 
specification of how the Secretariat will deal with functions not identified in the new 
organogramme. This includes issues such as monitoring and evaluation, co-ordination 
of donors and co-operating partners and regional operational activities. 
 
2.2.2 The Directorates and Clusters  
 
The four directorates each headed by a Director, falls under the Department of 
Strategic Planning, Gender and Policy Harmonisation. These directorates are 
 
 Directorate 1: Trade, Industry, Finance, Investment and Mining; 
 Directorate 2: Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; 
 Directorate 3: Infrastructure and Services; and 
Directorate 4: Social and Human Development and Special                              
Programmes 
 
According to the adopted report on the restructuring these directorates will essentially 
take over the policy functions of the sector co-ordinating units and commissions. All 
member states have been invited to second personnel to these directorates in the 
transitional phase. The selection will be made by the Secretariat based on merit. 
 
The team’s meetings with the Secretariat and sector co-ordinating units and 
commissions did reveal that there are still some uncertainties about this transfer. One 
concern is the staffing, composition and specific functions of the directorates. The 
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directorates may in many instances appear as little more than black boxes. The job 
evaluation study and the RISDP are expected to give more clarity. 
 
Another concern is the clustering of the sectors in the directorates. How should they 
relate to each other? A sector like water was originally split into two directorates (2 
and 3). Some consider that their sector unit is essentially crosscutting (e.g. 
environment, HIV/Aids) and are worried that these dimensions may get lost in the 
transfer. Gender is the only sector defined in the new set up as crosscutting and is 
therefore placed in the new Department of Strategic Planning.  
 
There may also be a potential concern about member countries’ representation in the 
new Secretariat. The Secretariat will need to balance the wish for individual 
qualifications and merit with a concern to ensure that all members feel that they have 
a presence in the new Secretariat.  
 
The biggest unresolved issue may revolve around some of the functions of the old 
sector units and commissions not yet clarified in the new structure. Most important 
here are operational activities such as project formulation, management and 
implementation. While it is true that the focus of the “new SADC” will shift from 
project planning and implementation to policy formulation and harmonisation there 
will still be a need to manage planning and implementation of regional projects. Also: 
How will ongoing projects be affected in the transition? What will the relations be 
between the directorates and member states in this area? It was indicated to the team 
that it was expected that highly specialised technical institutions - such as the 
Southern African Centre for Co-operation in Agricultural and Natural Resources 
Research and Training, the Regional Early Warning Unit (food security) or the 
Regional Tourism Organisation - should continue to stay where they are and operate 
as before.  For other operational aspects and project implementation it was expected 
that the new national committees (see below) should take over these responsibilities. 
While the majority of SADC projects (an estimated 80%) are national in character and 
therefore may be managed by national authorities, there are also many that are 
regional. This raises a number of difficult issues since these functions of particular 
sector units cannot automatically be divided and taken over by individual national 
committees. This will be further discussed in the case studies in the next chapter. 
 
Directorate 1 was launched in August 2001. When the team visited in October it had a 
staff of five, seconded from Mozambique, South Africa, Lesotho and Zimbabwe in 
addition to three expatriate experts funded by aid donors. This group is essentially 
identical with the technical assistance team set up to work on the implementation of 
the trade protocol (see more on this in the next chapter). The trade and industry 
section expects to recruit an additional two-three people. Member countries have been 
invited to submit names for secondment. Tanzania, which hosts the Trade and 
Industry Sector Co-ordinating Unit, has submitted the names of five of the seven 
professionals in the present unit. No decision had been taken when the team visited 
and there had, according to the Sector Co-ordination Unit, not been any 
communication to them about requirements and when a decision are to be expected. 
 
The Finance and Investment Co-ordination Unit (FISCU) is based at the National 
Treasury in South Africa. FISCU closed down on 2 August with the launch of 
directorate 1. It had a staff of four-five professionals. They were offered to move to 
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Gaborone on secondment from South Africa, initially for a period of six months. The 
staff found this little attractive and has opted to remain at the National Treasury in 
South Africa. They are now working on South African positions and policies in this 
area. The International Financial Relations Directorate in the Treasury is preparing for 
the establishment of a project management team of contracted staff to run with FISCU 
tasks in directorate 1. It will at the earliest be operational in February 2002. South 
Africa expects to secure funding for this from the European Union. These funds may 
still be channelled through South Africa. (The proposed management team was 
envisaged before the decision to relocate to Gaborone.) 
 
FISCU is responsible for the development of the finance and investment framework 
for regional economic co-operation. Based on a series of Memoranda of 
Understandings to be completed by mid-2002 it is expected that a Protocol on Finance 
and Investment will be ready by mid-2003 and ratified in 2004. The protocol will 
inter alia address issues such as macro-economic harmonisation and development 
finance. The South African National Treasury does not expect that the transfer of 
functions from Pretoria to Gaborone will cause delays in this time schedule assuming 
that the project management team becomes operational as scheduled. A number of 
technical sub-committees continue to function uninterrupted by the transfer to 
Gaborone. 
 
The team did not have access to information about the transfer of the mining sector 
co-ordination unit in Zambia.  
 
Directorate 2 is expected to be launched in December 2002. The key components here 
are the functions located with the Food and Agriculture Sector Unit in Zimbabwe but 
functions from the Wildlife, Fisheries and Forestry and other units will also be 
incorporated. The main unit in Harare has however, not yet received any information 
about the details of the transfer or staffing requirements. A meeting between the 
Harare unit and the Secretariat was to be held shortly after the team’s visit. 
 
This cluster of sectors is the largest within SADC accounting for more than half of all 
SADC programmes of action. It also involves a complex array of technical aspects 
and institutional arrangements that have implications for the implementation of the 
institutional reforms.2  
 
Directorate 3 will deal with transport and communication; water; energy; and tourism. 
It is scheduled to be launched in August 2002. Commissions manage the transport and 
energy sectors. The Luanda-based Technical Unit of the Energy Commission was 
established on 1 April 2001. A regional staff of four was envisaged in the Luanda 
unit, but following the decision to relocate to Gaborone it was decided to only hire 
one (the Director). The rest of the staff is Angolan civil servants who staffed the 
former sector co-ordination unit.  
 
A first meeting between the four units comprising infrastructure and services and the 
Secretariat was to be held shortly after our interviews with the energy unit. See more 
in the discussion of energy and water in the next chapter.  
                                                     
2 See here also the unpublished report from SADC FANR Sector Co-ordinators Retreat on the 
Restructuring of SADC Institutions, Kariba, Zimbabwe, July 19-20, 2001. 
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Directorate 4 shall deal with human development issues; health and welfare; 
HIV/AIDS; disaster management; culture and sport; and special programmes 
(combating illicit drugs and small arms trafficking as well as demining). 
 
The team noted reservations and uncertainties about the phasing out of the sector co-
ordinating units and the transfer to an expanded Secretariat in Gaborone. It must 
however also be emphasised that the team was left with the impression that all those 
interviewed showed commitment and support for these changes. Many sector co-
ordinating units and commission secretariats have also been active in submitting 
proposals to the Secretariat to find solutions to some of these uncertainties and 
unresolved issues. 
     
2.3 The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation 
 
The SADC Summit in Blantyre also adopted the long-awaited Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation. (Angola was the only member not signing the 
Protocol. The team was assured that this was due to technical legality problems and 
that Angola welcomed the protocol and would be in a position to sign it shortly.) It 
now has to be ratified by two thirds of member states before coming into force. 
 
In 1996 SADC decided to create an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. It never 
became operational and a variety of problems erupted. The chairing of the Organ, the 
permanency of that position and its status vis-à-vis SADC became hotly contested 
issues.3 At the Blantyre Summit, and after intense negotiations and pressure, it was 
decided to bring the Organ firmly under SADC control. A Troika composed of the 
new Chair (Mozambique) the outgoing Chair (Zimbabwe) and the incoming Chair 
(Tanzania) will lead it. 
 
The Protocol also provides for an elaborate structure of the Organ. Cf. fig. 1 in Ch. 1. 
Under the Chair and the Troika there is a Ministerial Committee comprised of the 
SADC ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state 
security. It operates much like the SADC Council of Ministers and has a partly 
overlapping membership. 
 
The Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) comprises the ministers 
responsible for foreign affairs. It shall perform such functions as may be necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy. It may 
establish such substructure as it deems necessary. 
 
The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) comprises ministers 
responsible for defence, public security and state security. It is an established 
committee formed more than 20 years ago as the Frontline States (it became ISDSC 
when South Africa, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho joined after 1994). It has a fairly 
elaborate substructure, especially under the Defence subcommittee and a range of 
sub-sub committees on functional areas of co-operation. Under the public security 
                                                     
3 Cf. the presentation and analysis in Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, “Regionalism into globalism? SADC 
and Ecowas Compared”, Africa Security Review, vol. 10, 2001, 2: 7-18 
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ministers there is the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordination 
Committee (SARPCCO) which has a permanent secretariat hosted by the Secretariat 
of the Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau for Southern Africa located in Harare. The 
ISDSC itself has never had a permanent secretariat. These services are provided by 
the ISDSC Chair on a rotational basis (currently Lesotho). 
 
The draft protocol proposed that the Chair of the Organ also should provide the 
Secretariat of the Organ. This was changed at Blantyre and a new paragraph was 
inserted stating that the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone should provide those services. 
The full implications of this are not yet clarified, but it is expected that the Secretariat 
primarily will provide administrative assistance and support and may not play any 
role in policy formulation and harmonisation. The Secretariat will dedicate personnel 
for this and the Terms of Reference for new positions as “political officials” was 
being prepared while the team visited Gaborone.  
 
The section servicing the Organ will be in a different position compared to the other 
sections in the Secretariat considering the sensitivity of some of the issues they would 
be expected to deal with. It may also, as suggested to the team, be physically separate 
from the rest of the Secretariat. Furthermore, it was still to be decided whether to 
launch this section now or wait till the Protocol has been ratified. When the team 
visited it was expected that Mozambique as the Chair of the Organ would call a 
meeting to get a clarification on this matter.  
 
There are also other dimensions of the SADC Secretariat’s work, which has to be 
clarified in relation to the Organ. Following the political dialogue between SADC and 
the European Union (since the launch of the Berlin Initiative in 1994) the Secretariat 
has started a number of Special Programmes (to be located in Directorate 4) focusing 
on issues falling under the SADC Organ. Directorate 4 also deals with disaster 
management and humanitarian assistance. These programmes and projects are also 
activities falling under the auspices of the Organ. In the discussion of the Special 
Programmes at the Blantyre meeting of Council of Ministers it was also decided that 
the Secretariat should work closely with SARPCCO. The Council of Ministers 
directed SARPCCO to consider reinforcing its Secretariat with personnel to work on 
these issues. 
 
See Ch. 3.6 for an assessment of the Organ and its ability to achieve its objectives.   
     
2.4 SADC National Committees 
 
The amended SADC Treaty also provides for the creation of SADC National 
Committees consisting of key stakeholders. Apart from the government this is 
specified to be the private sector, civil society, non-governmental organisations, and 
workers and employers organisations. The composition shall, according to the Treaty, 
reflect the core areas of integration and co-ordination (i.e. the functions of the four 
directorates).  
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It is the obligation of each member state to create such committees. The committees 
shall according to the guidelines inter alia4 
 
• provide input in the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and 
programme of action;  
• co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of SADC programme 
of action; 
• promote and broaden stakeholder participation in SADC affairs in 
member states; 
• facilitate information flows and communication between member 
states and the SADC Secretariat; and 
• co-ordinate the provision of inputs for the development of the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and monitor its 
implementation.  
 
Furthermore, it is envisaged the national committees shall fill the temporary vacuum 
which is expected with the phasing-out of Sector Co-ordinating Units from member 
states to the Secretariat (see 2.2.2 above). 
 
The national committees will have a steering committee and a secretariat. Each 
national committee will also have sub-committees and technical committees, which 
may correspond to the directorates and its functions. Sub-committees and technical 
committees will operate at ministerial and officials level although other stakeholders 
will also be involved at this level according to the guidelines issued by the SADC 
Secretariat (and approved by the Council of Ministers). 
 
The lines of communication and lines of authority between the national committees 
and the Secretariat and other structures are not clearly identified in the documents 
available to the team. Communication and authority may go through the SADC 
national contact point in the Ministry responsible for SADC Affairs, but it could also 
be directly. 
 
The introduction of national committees is clearly motivated by a need to build 
knowledge, popular support and legitimacy for SADC and the regional project. This is 
considered crucial to achieve success, particularly following the closure of sector 
units in member countries. The team noted that the member countries visited were in 
different stages of preparation. One country had already established a committee, 
others were preparing for it and some had not yet addressed the issue. 
 
It is also apparent that member countries visited approach the concept of the national 
committee differently. Some may envisage little more than an interdepartmental 
working group, while others seem to prepare for major national consultations and 
workshops.  The success of these committees will obviously also vary and depend on 
country specific conditions. In some member countries there may be few traditions for 
this type of government-stakeholder relations, or the level of trust and conflicts may 
be such that it will be difficult to establish committees. 
  
                                                     
4 Cf. the SADC Secretariat’s Draft Guidelines on SADC National Committees (n.d. (2001)). The draft 
guidelines was approved at the Council of Ministers Meeting in August 2001. 
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Issues falling under the Organ (such as human rights, democratisation or defence) are 
not specifically included in the tasks of the national committees. Governments in 
some countries consider these issues too sensitive while others are receptive to a 
possible inclusion. 
 
The role of parliament and parliamentary oversight are not addressed in the SADC 
documents discussing national committees. This is somewhat surprising considering 
that the SADC Parliamentary Forum (see more below) has defined a key role for itself 
in strengthening SADC and in facilitating SADC polices. 
  
2.5 Other SADC-related institutions and stakeholders 
 
Parallel to the growth of SADC there has been launches of a number of regional 
organisations and stakeholders pursuing principles and programmes consistent with 
SADC’s Objectives and Common Agenda. SADC emphasises the participation of 
these stakeholders also at the regional level. This is formalised though either 
accreditation, memorandum of understanding or memorandum of association.5 
 
It is envisaged in the amended SADC Treaty that stakeholders, including NGOs, civil 
society, workers’ and employers’ organisations, should take part in sub-committees of 
the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM). Employers’ and workers’ organisations 
shall also take part in ICM meetings and Ministerial meetings of the cluster of Social 
and Human Development and Special Programmes. 
 
The participation of the above mentioned institutions are mainly regulated through a 
Memoranda of Understanding. Such MoU’s are drawn up or in the process of being 
drawn up with institutions such as the SADC Council of NGOs (SADC-CNGO), the 
Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI) and the 
Southern African Trade Union Co-ordination Council (SATUCC). Others are SADC 
Women in Business, the SADC Banking Association, the Electoral Commissions 
Forum of SADC Countries and the SADC Lawyers Association. 
 
However, many of these organisations remain weak and vulnerable and their capacity 
to participate and make input is often limited. 
 
There are also a number of other public SADC institutions, which operates 
independently. Chief among these is the particularly interesting organisation, the 
SADC Parliamentary Forum. It was formally established in 1996 and approved as an 
autonomous SADC institution by the SADC 1997 Summit. It has a permanent 
Secretariat in Windhoek. The forum is made up of national delegations of four 
members of parliament, including the Presiding Officer and at least one member of 
the opposition. It meets twice a year.6 DRC and the Seychelles are not members of the 
Forum. 
 
                                                     
5 See also pp 233 –240 in The IGD Guide to the Southern African Development Community, 
Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue 2001. 
6 The SADC Parliamentary Forum maintains a particular informative website,www.sadcpf.org 
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The Forum’s chief objectives are to promote democratisation in Southern Africa, 
involve parliamentarians in SADC activities, and facilitate implementation of SADC 
policies. Its main activities are focused on building capacities of parliamentarians 
through training and other means, and to facilitate free and fair elections through 
dispatching election observers to member countries.  
 
The role of the SADC Parliamentary Forum or the role of parliaments in general has 
not been addressed in SADC restructuring documents available to the team. 
   
The are also a number of overlapping and to some extent also competing initiatives 
promoting regional economic integration. They are discussed in the next chapter. 
  
2.6 Resource mobilisation 
 
The current funding arrangements reveal a high reliance on foreign donor funding for 
SADC projects and programmes. The donor-dependence has been a major concern for 
years, but not much has been achieved in terms of reducing this dependence. Major 
portions of the costs related to the planning and implementation of the restructuring 
process are also covered by foreign donors.7 The restructuring report emphasises the 
need for changes both in relation to member state contributions and contributions of 
regional stakeholders and the private sector. 
 
It is particularly important that SADC is in a position to fund the running of its 
Secretariat and other institutions. The membership fee is critical here. Currently all 
SADC countries pay an equal membership fee to the SADC Secretariat (and to the 
two commissions). Most member countries are however lagging behind in the 
payments. The outstanding contributions per July 2001 were over USD 9 million 
according to the Secretariat’s report to August meeting of the Council of Ministers. 
The contributions from member countries will have to increase following the 
implementation of the new institutional framework. With the move to Gaborone 
member countries will save local currency, but they will have to allocate far more in 
foreign currency to run the expanded Secretariat. Recommendations for a new 
formula for membership contributions were presented to the Council of Ministers in 
August 2001. The proposed formula based on GDP and population size was not 
approved and the working group was asked to take additional criteria into account. 
The basic premise is however that the richer countries shall pay more than poor 
countries. One dimension mentioned in the team’s interviews is also that no country 
shall pay more than 20-25% and no country less than 3-4%, so that no country will 
dominate financing and all countries will pay a sizeable share. 
 
An agreement on a new formula is crucial to make the new institutional set up 
financially sustainable. It will not be possible to increase the equal rate to the level 
required to fund the costs of running the new Secretariat. Various regional levies and 
                                                     
7 The most recent overviews of donor contributions available to the team are Co-operation between the 
United Nations and the Southern African Development Community. Report of the Secretary-General, 
New York: UN General Assembly July 2001 (A/56/134) and T. A. Ersdal & J. Claussen: Overview of 
the SADC Program and Donor Cooperation, Oslo: Nordic Consulting Group September 2001 (Report 
commissioned by NORAD). These reports are not up to date and have major gaps.    
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taxation schemes were also mentioned in the team’s interviews, but no specific 
feasibility studies or preparations were to be undertaken in the near future. 
 
Foreign aid donors are funding the bulk of SADC’s projects and programmes. This is 
not likely to change significantly in the medium term, but it is strongly emphasised 
that more emphasis will have to be placed on mobilising investment from the private 
sector. This has also manifested itself in activities and work plans of some of the 
sector units, e.g. in the energy sector (the energy commission hosted an investment 
conference in September 2001). Private and foreign investment has also been 
mobilised for regional projects, especially in infrastructure such as the development 
corridor between South Africa’s Gauteng province and Maputo in Mozambique, but 
this has not been under the auspices of SADC. 
 
The March 2001 restructuring report also emphasises the need for the establishment 
of a SADC Regional Development Fund. This proposal was approved and also 
included in the amended Treaty adopted at the Blantyre Summit. A feasibility study 
will be undertaken under the auspices of the SADC Ministers of Finance to further 
explore this Fund. 
 
SADC will organise a consultative conference with donors, co-operating partners and 
others in Gaborone in October 2002. The theme is SADC Institutional Reform for 
Poverty Reduction Through Regional Integration and it is expected that this may also 
be an occasion to start the mobilisation of support and funding for policy 
implementation of the new Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (cf. Ch. 
3.1).  
 
2.8 Conclusion: A more efficient SADC? 
 
The new SADC structure is a major attempt to address the weaknesses, which have 
characterised SADC institutions since the establishment of the Community in 1992. 
The Secretariat was lacking sufficient authority and power, sector co-ordinating units 
were unable to pursue regional integration, and the SADC institutions were unable to 
adapt to the changing circumstances and challenges (cf. Ch. 1). 
 
It is not possible to pass any final judgement of whether the restructuring will succeed 
– we are still in the early stage of its implementation. What can be concluded is that 
the restructuring is addressing the key issues and that its main components – the 
centralisation in Gaborone and the phasing out of sector units and commissions – 
appear to have the support of member countries and stakeholders. All officials in 
members countries and sector co-ordinating units and commissions interviewed by the 
team supported the restructuring and were eager to see it work. There may be 
uncertainties about the specifics of the changes and the shift to Gaborone, but also a 
great loyalty to the decisions made. 
 
Solutions will however have to be found to a number of crucial issues. One revolves 
around the issue of SADC’s operational capacity. It is essentially functions related to 
policy planning, strategy and harmonisation which will be moved to Gaborone, and it 
remains unclear how functions related to operationalisation will be taken care of with 
the phasing-out of sector co-ordinating units and commissions. Who shall be doing 
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e.g. project formulation and implementation of regional projects under the new 
structure? SADC’s restructuring report refers to the principle of subsidiarity and it is 
expected that national committees in individual member countries shall be responsible 
for implementation at the national level. What this will mean in practice is unclear, 
especially related to regional projects involving two or more countries. The team 
noted uncertainties in the sector co-ordinating units and commissions and a fear that 
project implementation and delivery could suffer - at least while restructuring was 
ongoing. 
 
A second major challenge is the capacity constraints. The management of complex 
regional co-operation efforts requires the availability of a pool of political and 
technical experts. Such expertise is scarce in the region. This is one reason why many 
sector co-ordinating units have performed so poorly. The Secretariat is bound to 
experience difficulties in recruiting professionals. The technical capacity in most 
member countries to participate and to implement is also very limited. There is no 
easy solution to this, but it underlines the importance of a sharp focus and 
prioritisation of scarce resources. 
 
Thirdly, there are a host of practical problems and obstacles, which may slow down 
and hamper the restructuring. One is the availability of accommodation and office 
facilities, another is the difficulty of getting suitably qualified personnel to come to 
Gaborone on short secondments. 
 
Fourthly, SADC needs to agree on a new formula for membership fees and 
contributions.  It is important that the members contribute what is required to fund the 
SADC Secretariat and other institutions. 
 
All of these problems and challenges are likely to cause delays. This is likely to be 
aggravated by SADC’s focus on the organogramme. Ideally, these organisational 
issues should have been addressed after the completion of a strategic plan of action, 
and after clarification of the specific functions of the organisation’s components, and 
not at the beginning. This is bound to create difficulties and delays. At the same time 
the Secretariat has to move speedily. If the implementation of the restructuring gets 
drawn out staff morale may be weakened, the best people may no longer be available, 
and the delays may impact negatively on project implementation and delivery. There 
is also the danger that these problems spill over into the regional political sphere.  
 
These challenges can, however, be overcome and solutions found which will create an 
efficient Secretariat in Gaborone. The main challenge is to make the engine run and to 
create an institution that is considered relevant for regional co-operation and 
integration. This will be addressed in the next chapter.  
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3: Making SADC work 
 
 
This chapter will assess the ability of SADC to harmonise policies and to implement 
programmes and projects facilitating and deepening regional co-operation and 
integration. To do this the chapter first discusses SADC’s efforts to formulate a plan 
of action. It will provide case studies of SADC’s policies and activities within trade, 
water and energy as well as its role in defending democracy, peace and stability in the 
region. The chapter also provides a discussion of South Africa’s role as well as the 
relation between SADC and other regional integration efforts in Southern Africa.  
    
3.1 Planning for development: the Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan  
 
SADC has prepared a wide range of protocols in an effort to develop joint policies. So 
far 20 has been signed, including the five most recently adopted at the Blantyre 
Summit, although only eight are ratified. A full list of the protocols and their status 
are presented in Table 2 in Ch. 1. 
 
The priority for the Secretariat now, apart from implementing the institutional 
reforms, is to focus on operationalisation of protocols and harmonisation of policies. 
The envisaged key instrument to achieve this is the development of a Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP).  
 
The SADC Council of Ministers in at its August 2001 meeting in Blantyre noted that 
the main purpose of RISDP is to 
 
 provide member states, SADC institutions and key stakeholders with 
any coherent and comprehensive development framework for the 
operationalisation of SADC’s Common Agenda and Strategic 
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Priorities over the next decade (2002 - 2011), with clear targets and 
time frames. The plan will take into account relevant and priority 
programs, activities and projects currently being undertaken by 
various SADC sectors and institutions. 
 
It was further noted that the Secretariat should play a leading role in the execution of 
the exercise, assisted as appropriate by member states and relevant regional and 
international organisations. The Secretariat has invited member countries to second 
staff to participate in the preparation of the Plan. The final report is expected at the 
end of June 2002. 
 
It is also expected that the directorates, the remains of sector co-ordinating units and 
commission secretariats together with the SADC national committees will assist in 
this process. The supervision of planning and monitoring will be undertaken by the 
Integrated Committee of Ministers. 
  
The Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions provides further 
information about the intention for RISDP. It lists 15 priority areas. Six economic 
areas are identified. 
 
1. Development of measures to alleviate poverty with a view to its 
ultimate eradication; 
2. Development of agriculture and sustainable utilisation of natural 
resources; 
3. Development of a common market through a step by step approach 
while restructuring and integrating the economies of Member 
States; 
4. Harmonisation of sound macroeconomic policies and maintenance 
of an environment conducive to both local and foreign investment; 
5. Development of deliberate policies for industrialisation; and 
6. Promotion of economic and social infrastructure development   
 
Two political priority areas are also outlined 
 
1. Consolidation of democratic governance; and 
2. Establishment of a sustainable and effective mechanism for conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. 
 
In the social area the review report identifies four priorities. 
 
1. Mainstreaming of gender in the process of Community Building 
through regional integration; 
2. Development, utilisation and management of human resources; 
3. Combating of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases; and 
4. Development of programmes for the improvement of quality of 
Health and Social Welfare. 
 
Finally, in the category “others” three priorities are listed. 
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1. Development of Science and Technology, Research and 
Development; 
2. Development of effective disaster preparedness and management 
mechanisms; and 
3. Consolidation of international co-operation with other regional 
groupings 
 
The Review Report did envisage a five-year plan, but the Council of Minister at its 
August 2001 meeting decided to make RISDP a 10-year plan. 
 
The RISDP exercise is very important at this stage of SADC's development.  
Interviews with officials in member states, civil society, donors and other 
stakeholders served to emphasise this. RISDP will provide SADC’s road map to the 
future. Ideally, however, the RISDP (and the job evaluation study) should have been 
prepared before the organisational restructuring  
 
Based on the national planning experience of a number of countries in the region the 
team will make two additional comments. First, RISDP should address the need for 
communication, and second the need for implementation and delivery.  
 
The new role that SADC plans to play, needs to be communicated and agreed upon by 
a number of constituencies. Study and analysis are important components of any plan, 
but without attention to consultation and consensus making, failure at the 
implementation stage is likely. The process of planning is more important than a final 
document. There are a considerable number of examples of well-written documents 
that have had no impact at all. It is important to think carefully through the various 
steps in the process and involve the political decision making level right from the 
outset. 
 
• The member states themselves do not only need to agree with other 
member states what the real and concrete priories are, but they also need to 
communicate this to domestic stakeholders groups as well as to the public 
at large;   
• A properly designed and agreed RISDP is needed for the Secretariat to 
function properly and efficiently and focus on implementation;   
• Inter-regional organisations like AU and the Nepad (see 3.2) need to 
communicate and co-ordinate with SADC in a concrete and project 
oriented manner; and   
• It was very clear from the donors interviewed that although they believed 
in the potential of the new SADC structure taking form, considerable 
contributions from them was contingent upon SADC having a realistic and 
timed plan where they could find appropriate areas of co-operation within 
the overall framework.   
 
There are also several reasons why the plan will have to concentrate on 
implementation and delivery: 
 
• Delivery means development that has a perceivable impact on common 
people's lives. The best way to build sustainable integration is to make it 
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clear to the broad groups of SADC population that the organisation brings 
benefits; 
• Member countries, which have gone through considerable changes in for 
example phasing out “their” sector co-ordination units, are now very keen 
on seeing the fruits of their sacrifices. Some demonstrable results in the 
first few years would boost SADC tremendously. It was apparent to the 
team that the concern for the distribution of benefits is now much less seen 
as a main problem for regional co-operation between developing countries 
than e.g. in the 1980s.  Free trade, which is now the major project of 
SADC, does not have built-in distributive effects favouring the poorest 
countries.  A well-conceived and well-implemented plan may contribute to 
correcting tendencies to skewness in the regional distribution of gains from 
integration; and 
• SADC has the goal of freeing itself from the donor drivenness of earlier 
years.  Reducing the donor drivenness is not primarily a matter of reducing 
the extent of donor funding.  It is rather a matter of controlling donors and 
fitting them into a framework set by the organisation itself. The 
organisation needs somehow to “get in ahead of the game” and be able to 
show donors where they fit in instead of reacting to their ideas of projects 
without an internally agreed framework. 
 
In view of the short time allowed for preparation of the RISDP, and the need to 
deliver, it would be necessary for SADC to focus on instruments and targets over 
which the organisation has some degree of control.  It would be important to avoid the 
temptations of trying to produce a complete master plan for the entire region and all 
sectors.  This would be a repeat of the past mistakes at the national level, where often 
both planning resources and administrative (implementation) resources have been all 
too scarce in comparison to ambitions. The failure of wide-ranging national plans is 
well recognised by now and it would be unfortunate to try the same on a regional 
basis. 
 
The ten-year plan horizon ought to be considered on the background of the time 
available for preparing it. It is fairly normal for a national plan to have a “construction 
period” of one to two years. With a mid-2002 deadline for completion of the RISDP it 
is hardly possible to ensure that the necessary communication and consultation 
activities takes place. A stepwise approach might be devised whereby key 
(implementable) parts of the RISDP are first developed and properly consulted so that 
implementation may start, whereas a fully fledged plan may be produced over the 
ensuing one to two years. 
 
It is also important that the Secretariat strengthens its capacity to monitor and evaluate 
the implementation of protocols and policies. This is also emphasised in the 
restructuring documents, but so far it has received limited attention in the ongoing 
institutional restructuring. 
 
3.2 South Africa, Nepad and the region 
 
In many respects South Africa holds the key to development of the region. Its 
economy accounts for three-quarters of the region’s GDP; its infrastructure, 
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institutions and skills supply are superior to the rest of Southern Africa; and it is de 
facto the regional “superpower”. Like virtually every regional co-operation efforts 
dominated by one country, SADC’s future is intimately tied to the role of the regional 
hegemon, South Africa. It will be difficult to make substantial progress in Southern 
Africa without South Africa taking a strong pro-active position.  
 
The post-apartheid political leadership in South Africa has shown a strong 
commitment to SADC and the region, but for most of the time since the 1994 
elections it has pursued an inward-looking policy focusing on domestic issues. The 
low regional profile in the early days was partly because of the need to consolidate 
power and capacity constraints, but also because South Africa lacked a clearly 
articulated foreign and Africa policy. The new South African leaders were also 
reluctant to be seen as taking a pro-active and dominant position in the region. 
 
At the same time there has been a rapidly growing South African economic 
involvement in the region. This has mainly been through export promotion and 
investment, especially in mining, agriculture, infrastructure and services. This has also 
included a number of significant private-public partnerships in regional investment 
projects, especially the so-called spatial development initiatives and development 
corridors. There has also been a significant expansion of regional interaction from 
“below” – informal economic interaction, population movements and civil society 
networks.1 
 
The later 1990s saw the emergence of a new and more pro-active South African 
foreign policy, also in relation to Africa and the SADC-region. This was intimately 
tied to Thabo Mbeki and his vision for an African renaissance.2 This evolving 
ideology provided the platform for a more active Africa policy with South Africa 
asserting itself as a regional or even continental hegemon. However, at the same time 
South Africa strongly emphasised the need for consultation, dialogue and co-
operation with its neighbours and other African countries. South Africa’s more active 
position within SADC – evident through its strong role in pushing the current 
restructuring – may be interpreted as an expression of these emerging new attitudes. 
 
The most important manifestation of South Africa’s new role is however, the launch 
of Mbeki’s Millennium Africa Programme in early 2001. In July the OAU adopted a 
merger of this plan and Senegal’s Omega Plan under the name the New Africa 
Initiative. At the Abuja-meeting of the Implementation Committee in October 2001, 
the name was changed to New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Nepad. It is 
now a continent-wide initiative, backed by the OAU/AU, calling for renewed efforts 
to take Africa out of poverty and halt the marginalisation of the Continent in the 
globalisation process.3 Nepad calls for  
 
                                                     
1 See e.g. B. Odén: “South Africa in Southern Africa: Revisiting the dynamo-albatross debate”, pp. 
116-142 in L. Thompson (ed.): Development, Democracy and Aid in Southern Africa, Cape Town: 
Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape 2000 (Monograph Series No 1). 
2 See more about the background and visions in e.g., M. W. Makgoba (ed.): African Renaissance, Cape 
Town: Tafelberg 1999. 
3 Cf. the official Nepad document; The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), October 
2001, and the Communiqué from the NEPAD Implementation Committee meeting in Abuja, 23 
October 2001.  
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• increased capital inflow through development assistance, debt relief, 
private and public investments; 
• improved market access for Africa’s products; 
• prioritisation of efforts to bridge the infrastructure gap and to improve 
human resource development; and 
• Africa countries to establish the conditions for sustainable development 
through peace, security, democracy and good governance. 
 
Nepad has established a Heads of State Implementation Committee composed of three 
representatives from each of Africa’s five regions. Botswana, Mozambique and South 
Africa represent the SADC region. The Implementation Committee intends to meet 
quarterly. It is assisted by a Steering Committee and a very small Secretariat located 
in Pretoria. Various African organisations will develop specific implementable 
projects and programmes. The OAU will identify and prepare projects within 
capacity-building on peace and security, and within agriculture and market access; the 
African Development Bank within the Central Bank and financial standards area; and 
the UN Economic Commission for Africa within economic and corporate governance. 
In addition, a specific subcommittee on peace and security chaired by South Africa 
was established. 
 
South Africa is investing considerable resources into the initiative. Government 
departments are allocating officials and setting up task teams to work on Nepad. 
Funds are set aside for Nepad-projects. What are the implications for SADC? Will it 
reinforce the role of SADC? Or will it marginalise the regional project? 
 
Nepad should not be seen as rival or competitor to SADC. Nepad will not be in a 
position to run its own development projects, but will have to work through sub-
regional groupings and individual countries both for the formulation and 
implementation of projects. Nor are Nepad’s priorities likely to differ significantly 
from SADC’s own priorities as they are expected to emerge in the RISDP (see 
above).4 
 
The main focus for Nepad is infrastructure and agriculture (and less on market 
integration and intra-regional trade compared to SADC priorities). Nepad has 
however, placed a strong emphasis on information technology which has been rather 
neglected by SADC. (At the Blantyre Summit in August 2001 a Declaration on 
Information Technology was adopted and the Transport and Communication 
Commission in Maputo was charged with the task of developing a SADC policy on 
this issue.) 
 
Nepad does introduce the possibility of excluding countries not satisfying the political 
criteria for sustainable development (revolving around peace and security, democracy 
and good governance issues). These criteria and their implications are still to be 
developed. It must also been seen in relation to Nepad’s South Africa-led 
subcommittee on conflict resolution (see also 3.6 below). The outcome cannot be 
predicted, but it will probably revolve around some emphasis on positive rewards and 
                                                     
4 Cf. also the Record of the meeting of SADC Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs and Finance, 
Blantyre, 13 September 2001. The meeting was convened to discuss the African Union and the New 
Africa Initiative (Nepad) and its implications for SADC. 
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less or no focus on negative sanctions or punishments for poor or non-performers. It 
may not be too deviant from the principles underlying the SADC Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation. Still, it is a potential important deviation from 
previous OAU/African Union principles where the emphasis strongly has been on 
universal application and non-interference. 
 
The potential negative impact of Nepad may lie in the possibility that South Africa’s 
human and financial energies increasingly may be focused on continental rather than 
on sub-regional and SADC issues. Likewise, other SADC countries and the SADC 
Secretariat may also be forced to spend time and energy on Nepad rather than on their 
core business. Some donors may also be lured to believe that continent-wide 
approaches may make it possible to by-pass sub-regional solutions. These dangers 
must however, be balanced against Nepad as an avenue to reduce Africa’s growing 
marginalisation and to give the continent a voice on the global scene. In the current 
situation this may be Africa’s only – and certainly the best – platform to negotiate a 
better position for itself. 
 
Finally Nepad’s governing structures and the emphasis on working with existing 
institutions on the continent is also giving the project a stronger African ownership 
and reduces South Africa’s dominance. This is especially evident after the Abuja 
meeting in October 2001. This way, South Africa’s new and more pro-active role may 
be more beneficial also for Africa’s future. 
 
In November 2000 the South African Parliament passed a law establishing a special 
fund, the African Renaissance and International Co-Operation Fund.5 The fund 
makes it possible for the South Africa Government through the Foreign Ministry to 
provide loans and other financial assistance facilitating South Africa’s co-operation 
with other African countries. This shall be achieved through support to regional co-
operation and integration; promotion of democracy and good governance; prevention 
and resolution of conflicts; humanitarian assistance; and human resource 
development.  
 
The Fund is a continuation of previous facilities funding economic co-operation. The 
new Fund does however introduce some potentially very important new features. One 
is the broadening of the scope to include issues such as conflict management 
democratisation. The other is the intention to use the Fund more pro-actively, also 
involving organisations and parties other than governments (the previous fund could 
only be used reactively after receipt of formal government requests). A final element 
is the introduction of a mechanism through which foreign and domestic donor (third 
party) funds can be channelled to recipients and/or joint tripartite projects. 
 
The more detailed terms of reference for the utilisation of the Fund still has to be 
developed. This includes a policy and regulatory framework, selection criteria for 
projects, mechanism for receipt of funds, etc. The Fund may become an important 
instrument for South African assistance to SADC and the implementation of the 
RISDP (and to Nepad projects), including the new focus on conflict management and 
democratisation issues. Alternatively, it may develop into simply a slush fund to 
                                                     
5 Information on the Fund is mainly derived from the home page of South Africa’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs, www.dfa.gov.za. 
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finance on ad hoc basis specific South African foreign policy activities. South Africa 
seems, however, to be ready to commit significant funding for the new Fund. Donors 
concerned with the future evolution of SADC must therefore closely monitor its 
utilisation. 
 
3.3 Trade 
 
One of the key obstacles to economic development and industrialisation in the SADC 
region lies in the size of the individual country markets.6 This has long been 
recognised, although at the beginning of SADCC the prevailing idea was that 
industrialisation would logically precede trade. The present paradigm worldwide 
stresses the opening of trade and build-down of obstacles to trade as a key ingredient 
to promote industrialisation. The countries of the SADC region seem to have accepted 
this, which has led to a much more market oriented industrialisation strategy, far 
removed from the erstwhile planning of industries.7  
 
The SADC Summit signed a trade protocol in 1996, which aims at establishing a 
SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) within eight years. On September 1, 2000 the SADC 
countries started implementing the Trade Protocol. The accord will cut tariffs on 
12,000 defined product areas in the SADC region. By 2008, the intention is that 85 
percent of intra-SADC trade will be freed from tariffs. From 2008 to 2012, the 
sensitive products will be liberalised creating a Free Trade Area by 2012.  11 of the 
14 SADC members have ratified the Trade Protocol. Angola, DRC and the Seychelles 
will not do so although Angola has indicated that it is considering it. 
 
The SADC Trade Protocol is considered a key instrument for forging regional 
integration in southern Africa. Within the SADC Secretariat considerable resources is 
spent on the implementation of this Protocol.   
 
In the preamble to the Protocol, the member states reaffirm their commitment to “link 
the liberalisation of trade to a process of viable industrial development...”.  The article 
on elimination of tariff barriers states that “the process should be accompanied by an 
industrialisation strategy to improve the competitiveness of member states”. 
 
The objectives of the protocol are to: 
 
• promote the liberalisation of intra regional trade in goods and services 
based on fair, mutually equitable and beneficial trade arrangements; 
• insure efficient production within the SADC that reflects the dynamic 
comparative advantages of its members; 
• create an enabling environment for domestic, cross-border, and foreign 
investment; 
                                                     
6  Cf. also the overview provided in SADC FISCU, Regional Economic Review, Southern Africa 
Economic Summit 2001, Pretoria: National Treasury 2001. 
7 The discussion in this section also relies on a paper prepared specifically for this study by the 
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), Kennedy Mbekeani: Status of SADC 
Protocol on Trade and Regional Integration, unpublished report prepared for CMI, November 2001.  
Cf. also the first background study for SADCC’s attempt to develop a trade policy, SADCC Intra-
Regional Trade Study, A study prepared for the SADCC Secretariat by CMI, Gaborone: SADCC 1986. 
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• enhance the economic development, diversification, and 
industrialisation of the region; and 
• establish a free trade area in the SADC region. 
 
The areas of co-operation identified by the protocol include eliminating obstacles to 
intra-SADC trade, customs procedures, trade laws, trade related investment matters, 
including measures for cross-border investment and other trade related issues such as 
trade in services and trade development. Article 25 deals with competition policy, and 
exhorts member states of an “to implement measures within the community that 
prohibit unfair business practices and promote competition.” 
 
The differences in incomes and the degree of industrialisation between the SADC 
countries present major challenges for co-operation. There is a danger that the least 
developed and least industrialised countries will, at least in the beginning, benefit less 
from trade liberalisation than others.8 The trade protocol recognises this asymmetry. 
The more developed countries – South Africa and the other members of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) – will therefore cut their tariffs faster than the other 
SADC members. 
 
3.3.1 Implementation and challenges 
 
Along with the start of building down duties, there has been considerable progress 
achieved in negotiations of other fields included in the protocol. Further efforts are 
continuing on outstanding issues pertaining to the need to improve market access and 
to resolve the rules of origin for remaining chapters. These developments are expected 
to accelerate the process for enhancing SADC capacity to participate in regional and 
international trade. 
 
There is clearly a danger that the extent of non-tariff barriers will increase as tariff 
barriers progressively go down. At Maseru (16 June 2000), the SADC Committee of 
Ministers of Trade reiterated its decision to eliminate core non-tariff barriers relating 
to cumbersome procedures and unnecessary measures which tended to impede intra-
SADC trade. Much of the work since then has aimed at clearing the outstanding trade 
issues including the special arrangements for textiles and clothing and sugar, as well 
as improvement of market access for BLNS based on specific requests. 
 
The core non-tariff barriers for which SADC has called for immediate elimination are 
as follows:  
 
• cumbersome import and export licensing and permits; 
• unnecessary import and export quotas; 
• unnecessary import bans / prohibitions; 
                                                     
8 This is also evident in two recent trade studies commissioned by Norwegian embassies in Southern 
Africa. See Overview of Malawi’s trade relations both regionally and internationally, Lilongwe: Imani 
Development 2001(Unpublished report prepared for the Norwegian embassy, Lilongwe, January 2001), 
and Economic Integration of the SADC Trade Protocol in Norad’s Assistance to the Private Sector in 
Mozambique (Unpublished draft report, Nordic Consulting Group, 28 September 2001).  
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• unnecessary services or charges not falling within the definition of 
import duties; 
• single channel marketing; 
• transit charges; 
• visa requirements; and 
• unnecessary technical regulations. 
 
Under the SADC Heads of Customs meetings there are four working groups dealing 
with such issues as rules of origin, customs co-operation, customs systems and 
procedures and transit action plan. 
 
Mozambique has submitted proposals seeking the SADC Protocol on Trade to allow 
LDCs to take temporary safeguard or remedial measures and also argued that 
technical and financial assistance should be given to LDCs to address the problem of 
costs that may arise from the dispute settlement process. This matter is not yet 
resolved. 
 
Rules of Origin for wheat and wheat products 
A particular obstacle has arisen in this area. The wheat producers in the region are in 
favour of strict criteria for regional origin because it will encourage the development 
of regional production of wheat. Non-wheat producers want less strict criteria for 
regional origin so that all countries could be able to trade in wheat flour and member 
states would be able to utilise the considerable excess milling with capacity in the 
region. 
 
The SACU / MMTZ issue 
The so-called arises because of the differences in the level of development between 
the least developed countries like, on one side Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and 
Zambia (MMTZ) and, on the other side the more developed SACU region. It has been 
accepted that SACU will build down its duty barriers faster than the MMTZ, but the 
problem is that within SACU the smaller partners, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland (BLNS) are much less industrially developed than South Africa. Some 
progress has been made in allowing the SACU countries greater access to MMTZ 
markets than South Africa, but there are still issues outstanding. 
 
Textiles and Clothing 
Since even the entire SADC region is a relatively small market, the consensus has 
been that exporters should look beyond the region for market access. Accessing the 
EU end US markets through the Cotonou agreement and the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) is of great importance (see more below). A regional 
strategy is needed to attract investment and increased production capacity in order to 
increase exports outside the region. Such a regional approach requires information 
sharing and strategic alliances between private sector companies. A roundtable 
meeting convened on the issue suggested that one should consider setting up a 
Regional Textiles and Clothing Information and Development Agency. 
 
The issue of the balance between the MMTZ and SACU and the situation of the 
BLNS within SACU is particularly felt in the textile and clothing sector. 
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It is also a problem that South Africa has considerable capacity in man-made fibres 
whereas other countries have next to none. 
 
Member states have been urged to accelerate their tariff phase-down for textiles and 
clothing. This is perceived to enhance the credibility of the entire trade protocol. It is 
also recognised that faster liberalisation will encourage both increased investment and 
inter regional linkages in order to supply first world markets under preferential access 
arrangements. 
 
Most of the textile sector issues are more or less settled. The secretariat in Gaborone 
does not seem to think that these issues present obstacles to further implementation 
 
Sugar 
The world sugar market is highly distorted. This is an issue that SADC can hardly do 
much about and the conclusion has been to hold sugar outside the free trade 
agreement.  South Africa produces about 2.2 million tonne sugar annually.  The other 
substantial SADC producers are Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Swaziland that produce 
less in total than South Africa. These countries, unlike South Africa, have open access 
to the European market, sell most of their sugar there and import for domestic 
consumption from South Africa.9 
 
Plastics 
In the plastics sector, discussions over rules of origin are still going on. The parties 
are now apparently very close to an agreement. The outstanding issue is largely how 
to deal with recycled plastic. 
 
Electrical and Optical Goods 
South Africa can produce most types of electrical and optical good whereas other 
countries do not have much capacity. South Africa therefore stresses a strict local 
content criterion for such goods to be traded in the regional market whereas other 
countries, which have little to protect, are in favour of very liberal rules.  
 
Motor vehicle industry 
In this industry the situation is much the same as for electrical goods. South Africa 
wants to have rules supporting regional/South African production while other 
countries favour more liberal rules of origin. 
 
Trade in services 
Preparations for negotiations have started. A meeting in Mauritius in May 2001 made 
progress in the preparation for further negotiations for liberalisation of trade in 
services and integration into the multilateral trading system under GATS.  
Agreements were made on a number of mainly technical issues. Member states have 
been urged to formulate national positions by involving all stakeholders as an input to 
common regional positions.   
 
                                                     
9 Cf. also R. H. Thomas: A SADC Sugar Agreement in the Context of the WTO and Global Sugar 
Trade, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue 2001 
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Customs administrative matters 
There are also a number of customs administrative matters where progress has been 
made or is planned: A number of countries have started printing of the SADC 
Certificate of Origin. Translation of customs documents into the other SADC 
languages (French and Portuguese) have also begun. Consideration has been given to 
draft guidelines for the SADC customs document. Ten countries have submitted their 
specimen signatures and stamp impressions. A project for modernisation of customs 
and trade facilitation has been set up under an agreement with the European Union 
that would supply experts on customs and transport. USAID has indicated readiness 
to assist national efforts for modernisation of customs and trade facilitation on the 
basis of direct requests from individual member states.   
 
Sanitary end phytosanitary measures/food safety 
A SADC consultative forum has been established in the area of sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) matters. The forum has been asked to accelerate the 
implementation of their recommendations on: 
 
• Identification of issues for immediate attention; 
• The need for immediate stocktaking of SPS/food safety issues in the 
region; 
• Establishment of information networks involving web-site and regular 
publication of SPS and food safety measures; 
• Proposals for an institutional mechanism for dealing with SPS and food 
safety issues; and 
• Developing a SADC protocol on SPS and food safety or as an annex to 
SADC protocol on trade. 
 
Trade with third countries 
The trade agreement between EU and South Africa causes SADC countries to loose 
some of their margins of trade preference vis-à-vis EU countries for export into the 
South African market. However, because the SADC FTA aims at a faster rate of tariff 
cuts and South Africa is giving more concessions to SADC countries at the early 
stage, the effect of this is dampened. It will however, as pointed out above, cause 
difficulties for the BLNS that they as part of SACU will have to eliminate their trade 
barriers to other SADC countries to the same extent as South Africa, although they 
are much less competitive and industrialised.10 
 
Another important question to be resolved is the relationship between SADC and EU 
and in particular the question of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements 
(REPAs). REPAs will open for free trade between EU and developing countries while 
complying with WTO rules. SADC will have to decide, at an early stage, what 
position to take on this. If the decision to form REPAs is taken, negotiations should be 
completed before 2005. Thereafter would follow a transitional period of anything 
between five and 15 years for the implementation of the new arrangements. 
 
A simplistic approach to the creation of a REPA for Southern Africa would be to 
extend the current EU-South Africa trade agreement.  It is however unlikely that most 
                                                     
10 See more on this in T. Bertelsmann-Scott et al. (eds.), The EU-SA Agreement. South Africa, Southern 
Africa and the European Union, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs 2000.  
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of the other SADC countries would see themselves benefiting from the same 
agreements with the EU as South Africa, mainly because of their very different 
economic structures. An establishment of a REPA would therefore entail considerable 
negotiations in order to reshape the EU-South Africa FTA so that the arrangement 
could be acceptable for the other and poorer countries. South Africa’s weight in 
SADC would mean that it would be difficult to change the agreement fundamentally.  
If agreement were not reached, the LDCs would still receive Lomé treatment whereas 
non-LDCs probably would be left with some form of GSP, causing deterioration in 
their trade preferences with the EU. 
 
The WTO millennium round will imply that all countries decide on their negotiation 
positions. In the negotiations SADC may have a co-ordinating or even negotiating 
role. At present it seems difficult to get a high degree of consensus among all SADC 
states.  Such a consensus may be a considerable advantage in further negotiation and 
consultation with other developing countries concerning the scale and coverage of the 
round. 
 
The African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), which is part of the “US Trade 
and Development Act of 2000” provides beneficiary countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
with liberal access to the US market. Basically the Act extends GSP status for 
qualifying African countries to September 2001 and expands the existing list of GSP 
products. The main effect should be to open the substantial US market to 
manufactured products from Africa. It also provides improved access to US credit and 
technical expertise, and establishes a high-level dialogue on trade and investment in 
the form of a US-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Forum. A trade and 
investment framework agreement is negotiated with COMESA and it is hoped, at a 
later stage, with SADC.11 
 
By mid-2001, 35 countries had been designated as beneficiary Sub-Saharan African 
countries under the AGOA.  Of these 11 were SADC member countries: Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia.  
 
It is argued that the AGOA promotes regional economic co-operation and trade by 
allowing cumulation among AGOA beneficiary countries. AGOA beneficiaries may 
include imports from other AGOA beneficiaries in meeting the GSP requirement of 
35 percent value added. However, when AGOA was introduced, several observers 
noted the danger that the bilateral agreements with US by participants in African 
regional groupings would tend to weaken these groupings. It was argued that the U.S. 
should enhance the ability of viable regional economic groupings to increase their 
trade, rather than to undermine them by setting up yet another layer of bilateral trade 
agreements. SADC’s challenge for the future will be to actively use features of 
AGOA that may strengthen SADC’s trade integration framework at the same time as 
it allows individual countries to benefit from the AGOA. 
 
                                                     
11 See here 2001 Comprehensive Report of the President of the United States on US Trade and 
Investment Policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act.  Washington, DC 2001 (A Report Submitted by the President of the United States to 
the United States Congress. Prepared by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. The First 
of Eight Annual Reports.  May 2001). 
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The Secretariat 
The Committee of Trade Ministers decided (on 22-23 July 2000) to set up a Trade 
Implementation Unit at the Secretariat in Gaborone as a matter of urgency. This unit 
co-ordinated the day-to-day implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol. It became 
the nucleus Directorate 1 when it was launched in August 2001 (Cf. Ch. 2.2.2. above). 
This suggests that the implementation of the trade protocol may be relatively 
uninterrupted by the institutional restructuring.  
 
Challenges  
Apart from the task of reorganising the secretariat at the same time as the trade 
protocol is implemented there are some major challenges ahead in the area of trade, 
finance and industry. 
 
First, the implementation of the SADC Protocol on trade is the immediate challenge 
to trade based regional integration. Evidence of implementation problems is the fact 
that three months after the implementation of the Agreement only four countries 
(Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland) have lodged their implementation 
instruments for the Protocol. The speed at which the rest of the SADC countries will 
lodge their implementation instruments will depend inter alia on the respective 
governments' fiscal position. 
 
Secondly, the different economic structures of the member countries and therefore 
their different abilities to take advantages of trade liberalisation will have to be 
handled. The SACU / MMTZ issue, the Mozambique proposal and the situation of the 
BLNS within SACU (see above) are all cases in point.  
 
Thirdly, the dual membership of some SADC countries to both SADC and COMESA 
could produce distorted incentives and bureaucratic problems as a result of the 
possible adoption of inconsistent obligations.  
 
Fourth, despite the agreements among the SADC countries that will deal with the 
international barriers to trade and industry, most of the countries have domestic 
barriers that may be considerable and may not be fully captured by the trade protocol. 
For an effective liberalisation of trade in the region, rules, regulations and various 
practices that are barriers to trade and investment must be resolutely dealt with by the 
member states within their individual jurisdiction. 
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that progress in this area is also closely linked to 
political developments. It depends in particular on peace and political stability. 
Zimbabwe’s role is crucial. Its economic position gives the country a key role to play 
in regional integration. The political crisis and economic meltdown in that country 
threatens to undermine progress and implementation also of the trade protocol. It will 
seriously impact on the speed and nature of the SADC project. 
 
3.4 Water 
The activities in this sector are aimed at providing adequate water and sanitation, as 
well as protecting the environment that yields these precious and finite resources. The 
Southern African region is drought-prone and suffers periodic water scarcity but it is 
not uncommon to see water wastage at every stage of its management. Water 
 37 
harvesting techniques are generally poor; the delivery system is wasteful; the pricing 
regimes are generally not cost-effective; consumption levels are high, particularly in 
urban areas; pollution control is generally ineffective; and actual management is 
fragmented. The problem extends beyond water as a resource but to aquatic resources, 
both freshwater and marine. The water scarcity and the uneven distribution of the 
water resource have remained a source of tension and conflict between SADC 
member countries.12 
Factors that are crucial for the sustainable use of water and need consideration in 
developing future strategies for the management of the region’s water resources 
include: 
• Growing demand due to population growth, improvement in the 
standard of living and economic development; 
• Establishment of water supply infrastructure which is influenced by 
the availability of water and demand; and 
• Legislation, policies, regulation, institutions and investment, which 
support the effectiveness of water resources management. 
 
The SADC-region has two main river basins, the Zambezi and the Orange. Other river 
basins include the Save, Limpopo, Okavango, Ruvuma and Cunene. One of SADC’s 
first efforts in this sector was therefore to adopt a Protocol on Shared Watercourses 
System. It was adopted and signed in 1995 and is now in force. A revised protocol on 
shared watercourses was signed in August 2000.  The revisions where mainly done to 
bring the protocol in line with international regulations. 
 
The main points of the protocol are: 
 
• Sharing of watercourse system by the basin states or riparian states, 
observing existing general or customary international law for 
management of shared watercourse systems; 
• Maintaining a balance between resource development and 
environment conservation; 
• Exchange information on hydrology, water quality etc.; 
• Utilise watercourses in an equitable manner, taking into account 
factors such as the social and economic needs of member state; 
• The prescription of co-operation institutions at three levels, at the 
SADC level, at the river basin level and at the level of river 
authorities or boards; 
• The objectives of the river basin management institutions which 
are to develop policies on monitoring water resource development 
projects, prepare joint development strategies for such systems, and 
supervise integrated water resource development plans; and 
• Harmonisation of national policy and legislation, collaboration on 
research, information and data handling, mitigation of floods and 
droughts and controlling desertification, preventing environmental 
degradation and undertaking environmental impact assessment of 
                                                     
12 See here also Munyaradzi Chenje & Phyllis Johnson (ed.): Water in Southern Africa. A report by 
SADC, IUCN and SARDC, Maseru and Harare 1996. 
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development projects. 
The SADC Ministers of Water has also adopted a declaration of water security for all 
in the 21st Century. A Southern African Vision for Water, Life and the Environment 
was presented to the World Water Forum and Ministerial Conference in March 2000. 
The main points are  
• Accessibility and provision of safe water for drinking and 
sanitation is ensured; 
• Water supplies are adequate to support agricultural production in 
such a way that sustainability is attained in both agriculture and the 
water sector; 
• The availability of water is not a constraint but serves to support 
industrial (non-agriculture) development objectives; 
• The negative effects of droughts and floods are minimised;  
• The use of water for human purposes takes care of and protects the 
environment and creatures that require water; and 
• Conflicts over water do not develop. 
 
SADC established a Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit (WSCU) in Lesotho in 1996. It 
has a staff of about 20 of which nine are professionals. WSCU developed a Regional 
Strategic Action Plan (RSAP) for integrated water resources development and 
management which was presented to donors and co-operation partners at a round table 
conference in 1998. The WSCU was then requested to further prioritise the projects in 
the plan and to develop appropriate project documents and put management facilities 
in place. 
 
When the team visited the WSCU in October the number of RSAP had been scaled 
down from 44 to 31 prioritised projects.13 Six projects are partly under 
implementation (mostly in a very early stage). A further 22 projects were approved 
for implementation at the Blantyre Council of Ministers in August 2001 and project 
documents for another six projects were under preparation. The development of one 
project is still pending. 
  
The 31 projects in RSAP are placed in six strategic subgroups: 
 
1: legislation, policy and strategic planning; 
2: awareness creation, capacity building and training; 
3: consultation and public participation; 
4: information collection, analyses, management and dissemination 
and improved national and transboundary river basin management, 
planning and co-ordination; 
5: infrastructure investment; 
6: stand-alone (special priority areas)  
 
                                                     
13 The information here is derived from SADC Water Sector. Regional Strategic Action Plan for 
Integrated Water Resources, Development and Management. Progress Report September 2001, 
Maseru: SADC WSCU 2001. 
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The main activity of the Sector Co-ordinating Unit has revolved around the 
development of project documents. This has included a substantial number of regional 
workshops and meetings in technical subcommittees.  
 
The water unit was supportive of the move to Gaborone, but did express a number of 
concerns. One major concern was the original suggestion to divide the water unit 
between Directorate 2 and 3. Following objections from the unit it now seems likely 
that water will stay in Directorate 3 on infrastructure and services to be launched in 
August 2002. 
 
No decision has been made regarding the staffing requirements in Gaborone. Member 
countries have been requested to submit names of officials for possible secondment. 
The WSCU expects that between one and three of their staff may move to Gaborone. 
They also expressed the feeling that donors were now holding back in their support 
for RSDP in anticipation for what might happen with the reorganisation of the 
Secretariat. They would like to be informed about what happened and be able to 
discuss matters of implementation with donors. 
 
It was the impression of the team that a number of the stakeholders in Lesotho felt 
that the water co-ordination unit had done well professionally and also had served to 
link Lesotho to SADC. There was uncertainty as to what would happen and how it 
would affect Lesotho’s position in SADC. 
 
One concern of this team is also the linkages between water and other sectors. Water 
is a crosscutting issue and this has not yet been properly addressed in the plans for 
institutional restructuring. Water has e.g., industrial uses, it is linked to agriculture 
and natural resources and it is key issue in the health sector.   
 
The case of the water sector in Lesotho may well be typical for the move to Gaborone 
of sector co-ordination units. Against a background of loyalty to the organisation and 
the decision taken, there was uncertainty about the specifics of the move, both at the 
level of professional staff and at the national policy level.  
 
A seminar with the other sector units and commission secretariats forming the 
infrastructure cluster was to be arranged shortly after the team is a visit to Maseru. It 
would be important that the seminar is successful and that clear indications of 
intentions soon would emerge from Gaborone. 
 
In the short run it will be important to not lose momentum in the further development 
of the regional strategic action plan. The responsibility for this lies both on the unit 
itself, the Lesotho authorities, the SADC secretariat, member countries and not least 
the donors. 
 
3.5 Energy 
 
Developing the energy sector is a major SADC priority. The exploitation of 
hydroelectric power, cola, natural gas and petroleum resources and the development 
of new and renewable sources of energy offer excellent opportunities for regional co-
operation. 
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The energy situation within SADC is characterised by a number of imbalances and 
inequalities. Although resources and installed supply capacity can largely cover the 
energy demand in the region, there is a number of unmatched supply/demand 
imbalances. The surpluses of electricity, coal and petroleum are unevenly spread over 
the region. Also, about 75 percent of the population still rely on the use of wood fuel 
as their main source of energy. There are considerable differences in the industrial use 
of energy between the countries. The most industrialised country, South Africa uses 
more energy than all the others do together. 
 
The region has two oil producers (Angola and South Africa). Angola produces about 
650 000 barrels per day and South Africa 25 000 barrels. South Africa has a total 
refinery capacity of 650 000 barrels per day while Angola has next to none. 
Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have considerable gas resources and are planning 
to exploit these towards the middle of the decade. Africa as a whole has some 6.4% of 
total world coal reserves. South Africa has the majority of these resources but there 
are substantial coal deposits also in Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, and Zambia. Also, the potential for renewable energy use, such as solar 
energy and wind energy is considerable. The low population densities in many areas 
make grid electrification with conventional energy expensive. 
 
The realisation of considerable inefficiencies in the energy sector, changing views 
about the roles of the public and private sectors as well as technological development 
has led to a need for a number of reforms in the power sector in the region. New 
policy frameworks will have to focus on competition and private sector participation.  
The industry structure and composition is changing. New regulatory frameworks will 
establish “rules of the game” in areas such as licensing and price regulation. The 
functions of producer, distributor and regulator, which before used to be vested in one 
power parastatal, are now seen as separate functions. There is a renewed emphasis on 
improving wide access to energy in a sustainable manner. 
 
The SADC energy protocol was signed in August 1996 and is now ratified. Its key 
objectives are to: 
  
• harmonise national and regional energy policies, strategies and 
programmes;  
• promote co-operation on energy development and pooling;  
• promote co-operation on regional development and utilisation of 
energy in a variety of sectors, including petroleum and natural gas, 
electricity, coal, new and non-renewable energy sources as well as in 
other areas of mutual interest; 
• ensure the provision of reliable and sustainable energy services in an 
efficient and cost-effective manner;  
• promote institutional and organisational capacity-building in the 
sector;  
• promote co-operation on research and development, adaptation, 
dissemination and transfer of low cost energy technologies; and  
• standardise appropriate energy applications.   
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The SADC 1996 Energy Co-operation Policy and Strategy identifies policies and 
strategies for the key areas energy trade; investment and financing; training and 
organisational capacity building; and information and experience exchange. This was 
followed by an operational 1997 Energy Sector Action Plan. It recommended that 
energy unit should concentrate on priority programmes and projects which could be 
implemented more easily on a regional basis for the benefit of the entire region, and 
not on those roles and task which should be the domain of the individual member 
states. Most of the activities of the energy plan have however not yet been 
implemented. 
 
In 2001 the SADC Energy Commission was established. The Commission now 
comprises SADC Ministers responsible for energy with the Angolan Minister for 
Petroleum as Chairman for the first two years. The Commission replaces the former 
Sectoral Committee of Ministers. The energy sector co-ordination unit in Luanda has 
been replaced with a SADC Energy Commission Technical Unit (SEC-TU), also in 
Luanda, but answerable to the Energy Commission.  
 
The director for SEC-TU, an Angolan citizen but regionally recruited, took up his 
position 1st April 2001. It was originally envisaged to recruit an additional three 
regional staff, but following the decision to move to Gaborone the recruitment was 
put on hold. Angolan officials from the previous sector co-ordinating unit presently 
staff SEC-TU. SEC-TU also relies on consultants to carry out its tasks. 
 
The chief activity of the Energy Commission is the further development and 
implementation of a regional energy activity plan. A new plan was approved at the 
Council of Ministers meeting in Blantyre in August 2001. It is basically identical with 
a consultancy report submitted to the Luanda-secretariat in November 2000.14 The 
report is a further development of the 1997 plan and seeks to detail a programme of 
prioritised activities than can be implemented over a 3-5 year period. A total of 30 
projects are identified. The plan also seeks to remove a substantial number of the 43 
projects in the existing energy programme, as their regional justification is weak or 
non-existent.  
 
The regional energy trade is given a high priority, on the background of the 
inequalities and imbalances mentioned above. Four of the six proposed projects in this 
area deal with various aspects of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)15 which is 
at the centre of the regional trade in electric energy. The two other projects are the 
establishment of the Regional Electricity Regulatory Association (RERA)16 which 
was approved in May 2000 and a project on harmonisation of policies, regulation and 
legislation in the petroleum sector. 
                                                     
14 Cf. SADC Energy Sector Activity Plan 2000-2005, Final Report 20 November 2000.   
15 The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) was inaugurated in 1995. While the utilities of southern 
Africa have been importing and exporting electricity for four decades, these trades occurred through 
bilateral contracts that were complex and often difficult to administer. The objective of shifting to the 
pool is to create a more efficient regional market. Confidence in the market and mutual trust between 
the members are being strengthened and sector co-ordination is dramatically improved. 
16 The Regional Electricity Regulatory Association (RERA) will engage in regional co-operation in 
electricity regulation. This will through building regulatory understanding, capacity and skills; 
promoting the establishment of independent regulators; assisting the harmonisation of legal and 
regulatory systems and practises governing electricity markets in the region; and regulation of 
interconnection and trade between SADC member states. 
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Twelve projects are listed under the heading Investment and Finance. Five of the 
projects relate to interconnection of national grids which will benefit the Southern 
African Power Pool, three of them deal with new forms of energy as well as the 
traditional energy sector. There are also projects for setting up a SADC energy forum 
and an Investment and Finance Co-ordination Task Force. The only energy 
development programmes are a joint SADC petroleum exploration programme and a 
joint hydropower development on the Cunene River. 
 
A major part of the resources for the plan is supposed to be mobilised from private 
sector commercial funding. Donor funding and self-financing will be used 
strategically to supplement commercial financing. Funds for financing of the 
elaboration of priority investment programmes, task force activities, expert assistance 
and studies proposed in the action plan will be sourced from SADC governments’ 
contributions, regional and international energy industry and donor agencies. The plan 
also considers it feasible to mobilise funds for the biomass energy sector and from 
climate change funding. 
 
Under the heading of Training and Organisational Capacity Building, the seven 
projects comprise the petroleum sector, capacity utilisation, rural and environmental 
matters, biomass energy conservation, an energy management and efficiency 
programme as well as regional integrated energy planning. 
 
The Information and Experience Exchange Activities include regional training 
activities, information management, regional energy planning network, the rural 
electrification initiative, and the establishment of a regional petroleum and gas 
association. 
 
The activity plan also lays out timeframes, priorities, responsibilities and resource 
requirements and sources, activities requiring co-ordination with others SADC sectors 
as well as linkages between focus areas. 
 
Officials in Angola and in SEC-TU interviewed by the team were supportive of the 
institutional restructuring. The Director of SEC-TU also indicated that it might be 
sufficient with three officials dedicated to energy issues in the new Gaborone 
Secretariat. They would work on policy development, harmonisation and resource 
mobilisation. The other SEC-TU activities related to the implementation of the energy 
activity plan might not necessarily have to be located at the Secretariat.    
 
Considering the projects listed in the SADC energy sector activity plan, it is clear that 
the role of SEC-TU in implementation is considerable. For all projects in the plan, 
apart for interconnection projects where relevant member states will have primary 
responsibility, SEC-TU is expected to take the role as an initiator, mobilise finance, 
monitor and/or organise activities. It is unlikely that only a few staff members in 
Gaborone can manage this. The expected size of the entire directorate for 
infrastructure and services which will cover development, maintenance and 
administration of energy as well as transportation, communication and water is 11 
staff members and one Director. At the same the capacity within the present SEC-TU 
is limited and early decisions regarding transfer of functions and size of staff is 
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important to avoid further delays ion the implementation of the new energy activity 
plan. 
    
3.6 Defending democracy, peace and security 
 
SADC’s 1992 Treaty strongly emphasised that consolidating, defending and 
maintaining democracy, peace, security and stability are among the organisations 
main objectives (Cf. Ch. 1). After years of controversy and debate the SADC Summit 
in August 2001 finally signed a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-
operation. The protocol provided a framework for SADC policies and activities as 
well as providing an elaborate institutional structure for the SADC Organ on Peace, 
Defence and Security Co-operation (Cf. Ch. 2.3). 
 
The protocol lists 12 specific objectives 
 
• Protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region 
against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, 
intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression; 
• Promote political co-operation among State Parties and the 
evolution of common political values and institutions; 
• Develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual 
concern and advance such policy collectively in international fora; 
• Promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related 
to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to 
this end; 
• Prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by 
peaceful means; 
• Consider enforcement action in accordance with international law 
and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed; 
• Promote the development of democratic institutions and practices 
within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance 
of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and 
Conventions of the Organisation of African Unity and United 
Nations respectively; 
• Consider the development of a collective security capacity and 
conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military 
threats; 
• Develop close co-operation between the police and state security 
services in order to address cross border crime and promote a 
community based approach to domestic security; 
• Observe, and encourage State Parties to implement United Nations, 
African Union and other international Conventions and treaties on 
arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states; 
• Develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-
ordinate the participation of State Parties in international and 
regional peacekeeping operations; and 
• Enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and 
co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance. 
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The new preoccupation with security and governance issues is typical for many 
regional organisations in Africa. Many – with Ecowas being a prime example – has 
seen the conversion from an organisation for economic integration to a provider of a 
diplomatic framework for military intervention. This should perhaps come as no 
surprise given the importance of political developments in accounting for Africa’s 
economic malaise. Nothing destroys economies as fast and as effectively as warfare 
or really bad government! Peace and good governance have therefore become the 
objective of almost any conception of current regional co-operation and integration 
efforts.17 
 
To what extent has SADC played a role in building and consolidating peace and 
democracy in Southern Africa? There are no shortages of conflicts and poor 
governance in the region. Most SADC countries are now formal democracies (the 
exception being Swaziland and DRC; the only SADC countries not ruled by 
governments chosen in multi-party elections). The reality is however, more 
contradictory and fluid. Probably not more than half the region’s states can be said to 
have their democratic credentials intact and even in those countries, stresses are 
evident. In two SADC countries there is continued war. Internal conflicts remain a 
serious problem in several member countries and may trigger real and threatened 
conflict also between states. 
 
In the past SADC has been incapacitated in dealing with the big political issues and to 
act as a manager of regional conflicts. The conflict in SADC’s newest member state, 
the DRC, even polarised SADC into two regional blocs.18 One group led by 
Zimbabwe comprised Angola, Namibia and the DRC itself. This group deployed 
military forces to assist President Kabila’s regime in DRC. They also adopted a 
collective security agreement in 1998. The other bloc led by South Africa comprised 
Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana, but also relied on implicit support of Zambia, 
Swaziland and Malawi. This group was disparate and less coherent compared to the 
other group. They were nevertheless united by a common desire to resolve conflict in 
general, and that in DRC in particular, by diplomatic and political means. Three of 
these countries, South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique, had also since 1994 been 
involved in finding a solution to the constitutional and political crisis in Lesotho. A 
failed military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 probably served to reinforce their wish 
to seek political solutions.19 
 
The divisions between these two camps persisted almost right up to the Blantyre 
Summit in August 2001. The main manifestation in the preceding months was the 
issue of a SADC Mutual Defence Pact. Angola and Zimbabwe wanted a defence pact 
obliging SADC members to also assist member countries in internal conflict while the 
South Africa-dominated group wanted to limit the defence pact to external threats. It 
                                                     
17 Cf. C. Clapham: “The Changing World of Regional Integration in Africa”, pp. 59-69 in C. Clapham 
et al. (eds.): Regional Integration in Southern Africa. Comparative International Perspectives, 
Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs 2001. 
18 Cf. Rocklyn Williams: “Managing Regional Security”, pp. 114-122 in The IGD Guide to the 
Southern African Development Community, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue 2001.  
19 See S. Santho: “Lesotho: Lessons and challenges after a SADC Intervention, 1998”, pp. 61-73 in D. 
Philander (comp.): Franco-South African Dialogue. Sustainable Security in South Africa, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies 2000 (ISS Monograph No 50). 
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was eventually agreed to go for the last option as reflected in the specific objectives of 
the Protocol (cf. above). A Draft Mutual Defence Pact has also been agreed as a first 
operationalisation of the Protocol. The Pact further reaffirms the principle of 
collective defence in the event of an armed attack against any member.20 
 
Further clarification of the protocol is required. In particular, SADC ought to develop 
manageable sub-strategies in areas such as democracy and human rights; security 
sector reform; peace missions; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. SADC 
may here draw on the experiences from the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), perhaps more so than the experiences of NATO. 
 
There is also the danger that SADC’s efforts in this field instead may focus on 
organisational issues and the structures of the new Organ. Such issues are important 
but should ideally flow after development and agreement of common approaches to 
the issues covered in the Protocol. 
 
The Blantyre Summit mandated SADC to immediately address two political issues. 
The first was a review of the member countries’ efforts to tighten oil sanctions against 
Unita with recommendations for further action. A draft report was being finalised for 
submission to the Chair of the Organ when the team visited in October. The second 
issue was the deepening political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The Summit 
decided to send a team of SADC Heads of State to Zimbabwe. The Presidents arrived 
for a meeting in Harare on 11 September. The meeting was significant. For the first 
time in SADC History the SADC members publicly criticised another member. 
Apparently no member country, not even Zimbabwe’s traditional allies, defended the 
position of the government in Zimbabwe. 
 
However, not much happened after the visits by the Presidents. When the team visited 
in late October the envisaged follow-up initiatives had not yet taken place. Among the 
political opposition and political observers in Zimbabwe there was a widespread 
perception that SADC had failed “once again” and the SADC diplomatic missions in 
Harare came in for strong criticism for their passivity in the situation. To the extent 
the international community put pressure on Zimbabwe it was primarily, it was 
argued, through the European Union and the Commonwealth with SADC playing a 
peripheral or no role at all. 
 
The lack of the ability to enforce is one strong criticism levelled against SADC. They 
make good statements, but lack the political will to ensure that members abide by the 
adopted policies and guidelines. A second criticism is that SADC’s positions and 
policies are not always consistent and sometimes contradictory. This is also the case 
with their commitment to democratic principles. Thus the Protocol on politics, 
defence and co-operation says the right things about democracy and human rights, but 
the Protocol on culture, information and sport signed at the same Summit has come 
under strong criticism for falling far behind international standards on freedom of 
                                                     
20 Cf. SADC Mutual Defence Pact, Draft Text 9 August 2001. The Pact was not signed at the Blantyre 
Summit as expected. The team was informed that more time was required on the technical and legal 
aspects of the Pact.  
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expression. It has also been suggested that the Protocol may even be used to curtail 
media freedom.21 
 
The criticism for SADC’s shortcomings and failures can make a long list. It should 
however, be noted that despite this the institutions falling under the SADC Organ has 
managed to build functional co-operation in a number of areas. This has made an 
important contribution in building confidence and trust among members, often also 
cutting across political divisions. The case of SARPCCO in crime prevention is an 
example22. Another is the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, which 
fulfils an important function in preparing the basis for joint operations and 
participation in peace missions.23 The RPTC falls under the ISDSC but is managed by 
the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence. In 2001 its staff became multi-national with staff 
seconded from six SADC countries. The role of the autonomous SADC institutions, 
such as the Parliamentary Forum, is also very important in this context. 
 
The key challenges for SADC’s operations in this field are implementation and 
enforcement. This is also evident with the existing ISDSC structure. Its many 
committees make a number of excellent decisions, but lack of a permanent secretariat 
has helped ensure that many of the decisions remain just decisions – they are never 
implemented. A permanent secretariat in Gaborone may help solve that particular 
problem. We should, however, not expect rapid progress. There are political divisions 
in the region and many member states are weak and vulnerable and reluctant to reduce 
its power by transferring it to regional or supra-national bodies. The problem is, 
however, recognised by an increasing number of SADC countries.  
 
The concern with the ability to enforce is also evident within Nepad. At the Nepad 
Implementation Committee meeting in October 2001 it was decided to establish a 
sub-committee on peace and security to focus on conflict management, prevention 
and resolution in Africa. The committee is chaired by South Africa with Algeria, 
Gabon, Mali and Mauritius as members. It remains to be seen what kind of 
recommendations will emerge from this committee. 
 
SADC’s work in this area will most likely be an incremental process that will require 
time and astute management. The experiences so far suggest that we may be cautious 
optimists.   
                                
3.7 SADC’s relations to overlapping regional groupings 
 
A number of regional country groupings pursue economic integration strategies and 
see themselves as building blocks towards the establishment of an African Economic 
Community. Several of them have overlapping membership with SADC as is evident 
from Figure 3 below. In cases where activity areas are overlapping there may well 
                                                     
21 Cf. the statement from the Media Institute of Southern Africa as presented in their journal free press, 
September 2001. 
22 See e.g. M. Shaw: “The Foreign Policy of Crime Control”, pp. 91-98 in South African Yearbook of 
International Affairs 2000/01, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs 2000. 
23 Cf. J. Cilliers: “Regional Security Organisations in Africa: An overview”, pp. 219-45 in South 
African Yearbook on International Affairs 2000/01, Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs 2000.  
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arise contradictions between the policies and projects of two organisations. This 
section will briefly review the major initiatives, which overlaps with SADC and 
highlight the key challenges. 
 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)  
COMESA has its roots in the early 1980s with the establishment of the Preferential 
Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA).24 PTA became Comesa in 1994. It 
has 20 member countries and a Secretariat in Lusaka. Its chief objective has all the 
time been to promote trade liberalisation and the eventual establishment of a Comesa 
free trade area. The Comesa Free Trade Area is a duty free, fully reciprocal 
arrangement on all goods, which confirm to Comesa rules of origin. 11 Comesa 
members (Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are members and have committed themselves to 
reducing intra-Comesa tariffs to zero. (Tanzania was originally a member of Comesa, 
but has withdrawn. Namibia and Swaziland are also members also of SACU (see 
below) but have been granted a derogation not to reduce intra-Comesa tariffs.) 
  
Comesa has made considerable progress in a number of areas. This include:     
 
• Removal of tariff barriers: As at 1s May 1999, three countries had 
published the 90% tariff reduction, seven countries had published the 80% 
tariff reduction, one country the 70% reduction and three countries the 
60% reduction;  
• Elimination of non-tariff barriers: The classic non-tariff barriers 
(quantitative restrictions, licensing, import permits and restrictive foreign 
exchange controls) have been largely eliminated;  
• Rules of origin have been simplified, with more scope for import content, 
by the adoption of a 35 percent local value added criterion.  
• The adoption of a single COMESA Customs Document to replace the 
previous multiplicity of documents (up to 32 in some countries) and to also 
serve for clearance of customs, warehousing, re-export and transit 
purposes;  
• Installation of efficient customs management systems to facilitate data and 
revenue collection and establish the basis for a harmonised tariff: the 
Automated System of Customs Data installed in 12 countries, Eurotrace in 
19;  
• A Customs Bond Guarantee Scheme to facilitate transit traffic and reduce 
the cost of financing transit goods;  
• Establishing the Trade Information Network, which now has some 47 
computerised focal points set up in 20 Member States. These focal points 
provide information on all export and import opportunities available in 
each country including trade flow analyses, company registers, 
comparative COMESA tariffs and national tariffs, non tariff barriers, and 
macro economic profiles of Member States.  
 
                                                     
24 See here also an article by Comesa’s Assistant Secretary-General, Sindiso Ngwenya, “Reviewing the 
differences and common goals of SADC and Comesa”, pp. 43- 50 in C. Clapham et al. (eds.): Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa, Comparative International Perspectives, Johannesburg: South African 
Institute of International Affairs 2001.  
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The histories of both Comesa and SADC have been characterised inter alia by 
complex issues of overlapping membership in both institutions involving several 
members in the region; tensions and threats generated in the playing off of one 
organisation against the other; and severe capacity and organisational problems. 
SADC’s new focus on trade liberalisation has reinforced the overlap between the 
organisations, but at the same time the relations between the two have improved. One 
would expect increased co-operation, especially at the technical level, in the 
implementation of trade polices. 
 
A main difference between the two organisations is the fact that South Africa is a 
member of SADC and not Comesa. The main intra-regional trade flows in Southern 
Africa is between South Africa and the rest of SADC. Another very significant factor 
is the principle of asymmetry in which the largest and most powerful economies make 
more extensive tariff cuts more rapid than the smaller and weaker. This is established 
in SADC’s trade policy, but not within the Comesa Free Trade Area. Thus South 
Africa (and the members of SACU) will cut their tariffs faster than the other SADC 
members will. No similar arrangement applies to Egypt, the economic power within 
the Comesa Free Trade Area.   
 
The dual membership of some SADC countries to both SADC and COMESA could 
produce distorted incentives and bureaucratic problems as a result of the possible 
adoption of inconsistent obligations. With the introduction by both bodies of free 
trade areas, with different initial tariff structures and rules of origin, trade between 
countries that are joint members of SADC and COMESA will be governed by 
competing conditions. Existing bilateral agreements will compound the problems. 
Differences in external tariffs among the countries may provide perverse incentives 
for trade and opportunities for rent seeking. Although these could be reduced by the 
adoption of common external tariffs by the regional trading arrangements (such as 
COMESA is planning for 2004), they will result in mutually inconsistent obligations, 
unless both adopt identical structures. 
 
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
The 1969 agreement establishing SACU is entitled The Customs Union Agreement 
between the Governments of Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. It is in 
some respects a continuation of a 1910 agreement between the same four countries. 
After independence in 1990 Namibia joined SACU and became the fourth member of 
the so-called BLNS. 
 
The framework set out in the Customs Union Agreement provides for the following 
areas of integration and co-operation: 
 
• Absence of duties and quantitative restrictions within the common 
customs area and a common external tariff; 
• South Africa may unilaterally decide on the common external tariff 
and also, (exceptional to any customs union) the level of excise taxes; 
• The BLNS may impose duties against South African imports as infant 
industry protection for a period limited to eight years. They may also 
be afforded protection in the entire common customs area if their 
production of any infant industry commodity covers at least 60 percent 
of demand in the entire common customs area; 
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• Any SACU member may enter into a trade agreement with outside 
parties, but it must be agreed with the other members; 
• All customs and excise revenue collected within SACU is paid into a 
pool that is held as part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of South 
Africa. The formula used for sharing revenue between the member 
states contains some compensation for the disadvantages of the BLNS 
being SACU members; 
• The agreement extends beyond the area of trade in that it contains 
articles on freedom of transport and on mutual non-discrimination in 
transportation; and 
• The Customs Union Commission, consisting of civil servants from the 
five countries is the main consultative body. There are our also 
technical committees as the Customs Technical Liaison Committee, 
central in the technical work on revenue distribution, the Trade and 
Industry Liaison Committee, and the Transport Liaison Committee. 
 
Over a long period the countries have conducted negotiations over a restructuring of 
SACU. At the time of the team’s visit to the region, the final legal texts were under 
preparation. It was expected to reach a final conclusion of the new agreement early in 
2002. 
 
It is likely that the new SACU agreement will be different from the original one in 
two main aspects: 
 
(a) The new SACU will be set up as an international organisation with 
an international secretariat whereas before it was under the control 
of South Africa; and 
(b) The formula for distribution of revenues will be changed. One 
portion (the import duty portion) will be distributed to members in 
relation to their trade. A second portion, coming from excise 
duties, will be divided according to the size of GDP. A third 
portion, the so-called ”development portion” will be divided on the 
basis of incomes per capita in such a way that the countries having 
a lower income per capita receives a higher share. 
 
SACU has gone in as a block in the SADC free trade area. In a somewhat similar 
way, the BLNS are part of the EU - South Africa agreement. Both these positions 
create difficulties for the BLNS. They are much less industrialised than South Africa. 
They have tried to remedy this by negotiating special clauses for the poorer countries 
within SACU. 
 
At present some countries, particularly Lesotho and Swaziland, depend on the SACU 
for a very high portion of their government revenues. As duties are reduced according 
to the countries’ membership in the EU-South Africa trade agreement, general WTO 
cuts, and the cuts in SADC duties start to bite, SACU will be less and less important 
and the BLNS will have to look at other sources of government revenue. 
 
When duties between SACU and the other SADC countries in the future approach the 
zero level, perhaps with some movements towards a common external tariff, it is not 
unlikely that SACU converges with SADC. 
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Fig 3: Regional Integration Organisations in Southern Africa 
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Africa market.25 As members of SACU, the BLNS states trade freely with South 
Africa and with each other (even though the levels between the BLNS states is very 
low), but tariffs with other countries have been high. Tariff structure and policy have 
been largely determined by South Africa, which pursued fairly protectionist policies 
until the early 1990s, when it begun to significantly lower tariff rates. Between 1990 
and 1998, average tariff rates on manufactured goods fell from about 32 percent to 10 
percent.  
 
The trade liberalisation initiatives now under way are likely to significantly lower the 
BLNS' competitive advantage in the South African market. The countries that will be 
mainly affected are the non-mineral economies, Lesotho and Swaziland. Botswana 
and Namibia whose dependence on the South African market for their exports is not 
as large, will only be affected through the labour market since South Africa is the 
largest market for their manufactured exports which takes the bulk of the non-
government employment. 
 
The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) 
Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles established the IOC in December 1982. The 
fourth member, Comoros subsequently joined. France is a member through the 
Reunion Department. The organisation covers a community of 16 million inhabitants 
and over 595 000 square kilometres of insular land.26  
 
The objective of IOC is to promote co-operation in trade, agriculture, fishing and 
ecosystem conservation, as well as co-operation in the cultural, scientific, technical 
and educational areas. The IOC has developed a wide variety of regional programs, 
co-operation in the economic sector has been a priority, as reflected in the 
implementation of an Integrated Regional Program for Development of Trade 
(PRIDE). 
 
The objective of PRIDE is to strengthen regional trade integration by lifting the 
technical and financial constraints on the private sector by increasing competitiveness 
and quality of traded goods. Two important components are (a) a general framework 
of action to liberalise trade in goods and services, investment, capital movements, and 
the movement of people and (b) facilitation of business contacts and partnerships 
through, e.g., trade exhibitions and trade missions. 
 
All IOC member states are also members of COMESA, and subscribe to the trade 
integration strategy of COMESA. Mauritius and Seychelles are members of SADC.  
The IOC is also involved in the RIFF in areas within its purview.  
 
Regional Integration Facility Forum for Eastern and Southern Africa (RIFF).  
RIFF (formerly the Cross Border Initiative, CBI) is based on a common policy 
framework developed by fourteen countries in Eastern and Southern Africa and the 
                                                     
25 Cf. also the study from the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis as summarised in C. 
Harvey: “The Impact of the EU-SA Agreement on Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland”, pp. 
83-94 in T. Bertelsmann-Scott et al. (eds.), The EU – SA Agreement. South Africa, Southern Africa and 
the European Union, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs 2000. 
26 See more on the IOC website http://www.coi-info.org/anglais/presenta/r-bot.htm 
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Indian Ocean27.   All countries, except Tanzania are members of COMESA and eight 
of them are SADC members. The Group has the support of four co-sponsors, the IMF, 
the World Bank, the European Union, and the African Development Bank.  
 
The CBI “constitution” was a “Concept Paper”, which was adopted at the First CBI 
Ministerial Meeting in Uganda in August 1993.  Subsequent meetings, (Mauritius 
1995, 1999 and Zimbabwe 1998) agreed on a “Road Map” for further trade 
liberalisation such as the elimination of tariffs on intra-regional trade and the 
convergence of external tariffs to a trade-weighted average of 15 percent. The 
organisation also deals with investment facilitation issues, including harmonisation of 
national and regional policies towards a conducive environment for efficient 
investment and trade flows. 
 
At the May 2000 Ministerial meeting in Mauritius the Steering Committee decided 
that CBI could not be said to be merely an “initiative” and should be renamed the 
Regional Integration Facilitation Forum (RIFF).  It was decided that with effect from 
May 2000 activities should be administered through the COMESA Secretariat; and 
that the main focus for RIFF should be the implementation of the Investment 
Facilitation Road Map. 
 
RIFF has avoided the creation of new institutions, placing responsibility for the 
design and implementation of measures to support the agreed policy framework at the 
national level. The RIFF governing structure consists of the ministerial meeting that 
brings together the Ministers of Finance of the participating countries. The Steering 
Committee is composed of six selected participating countries, together with the co-
sponsors and the Chief Executives of the participating regional organisations. Each 
participating country is expected to establish a Technical Working Group and a Policy 
Implementation Committee. Each country has also prepared a Letter of Policy, 
specifying the steps that the country would take to implement the various measures.  
A regional technical working group brings together all the national working groups 
for the purpose of reviewing progress in the implementation of the RIFF agenda and 
the execution of work programmes. 
 
Some progress has been made toward the aims set by the various countries. In the area 
of foreign exchange systems, most countries have removed restrictions on current 
account transactions by end-1998 and some progress had been made towards 
liberalising the capital account. Most countries met the objective of introducing a 
flexible exchange rate system within the context of a unified inter-bank foreign 
exchange market. 
 
On trade liberalisation and facilitation, virtually all countries implemented preference 
margins for other participants ranging between 60 and 80 percent. Three countries 
met the target of reducing their average tariff rates to no more than 15 percent. The 
pace of trade reform partly reflected concerns about the potential adverse impact on 
fiscal revenue. Notable progress was achieved in reducing non-tariff barriers to 
imports and trade facilitation through implementation of harmonised road transit 
charges, and the customs declaration form. 
                                                     
27See more on RIFF on the ADB website http://www.afdb.org/cbi. RIFF member states are Burundi, 
Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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In the financial sector, most countries have moved to the use of indirect monetary 
instruments to control monetary aggregates, and administered interest rates were 
phased out and replaced with market-based mechanisms. The number of both local 
and foreign banks increased. However, in some countries the degree of competition in 
financial markets was still limited to a few operators.  
 
In the area of investment promotion, ten participants completed the publication of 
investment codes, and substantive progress has been made in the remaining countries. 
There was slow progress in concluding double taxation agreements, in the cross 
listing of stocks, and in facilitating labour mobility (visa protocol, residence/work 
permits, and short-term entry permits). 
 
The Commission for East African Co-operation (EAC) 
Economic co-operation in East Africa goes back to 1900 when Kenya and Uganda 
started operating a Customs Union, which was later joined by Tanzania.  Since then, 
there have been a number of other co-operation attempts such as the East African 
High Commission (1948-1961), the East African Common Services Organisation 
(1961-1967). The former East African Community was established in 1967 but 
collapsed in 1977. 
 
The present EAC was established in 1993 through an Agreement for the 
Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-
operation. Full operations of the East African Co-operation, however, started only in 
1996 with the establishment of its Secretariat. The Treaty for the Establishment of the 
East African Community was signed on 30 November 1999 and entered into force on 
7 July 2000. The East African Community was formally launched on 15 January 
2001.28 Kenya and Uganda are members of COMESA. Tanzania is outside COMESA 
but a member of SADC. All countries are members of RIFF. 
 
The treaty covers a wide range of activities. Progress in economic development has 
included activities within trade, industry, investment and customs. In the area of trade, 
tariff reduction has been implemented in a way slightly biased against the stronger 
partner so that Kenya applies 90% and Tanzania and Uganda 80% of the agreed tariff 
reductions. All non-tariff barriers on cross border trade have been removed. EAC 
trade has also been facilitated by the adoption of a standardised single entry 
document, harmonisation of Customs Classification Code. During its meeting in April 
2001 the Council of Ministers directed that a Draft Protocol establishing the Customs 
Union be finalised by end of 2001. The Customs Union will provide for zero internal 
tariff regime, removal of non-tariff barriers and establishment of a common external 
tariff. 
 
Harmonisation of standards and specifications of goods and services is ongoing. A 
study on the EAC Industrial Development Strategy has been completed. 1998 saw the 
establishment of the East African Association of Investment Promotion Agencies, an 
Investors Guide to East Africa has been published and the partner states investment 
incentives and investment codes are being harmonised. 
                                                     
28 See more on EAC and development assistance in A. Tostensen, Supporting East African Integration: 
Assessing the Potential for Norwegian Support to the East African Community, Bergen: CMI 2001 
(Commissioned report for Norad, June 2001). 
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Convertibility of EAC currencies has been achieved and harmonisation of banking 
rules and regulations, VAT rates, and pre-shipment requirements are being 
undertaken. A particularly interesting area, not included in other groupings in the 
region is the institutionalisation of Finance Ministers’ pre- and post-budget 
consultations, regular sharing of information on budgets, tax proposals, trade and 
economic performance. Part of the harmonisation includes the reading of Budget 
Statements on the same day, and implementation of a Tripartite Agreement on 
Avoidance of Double Taxation.  
 
Under the auspices of the East African Securities Regulatory Authorities, capital 
markets policies, trading practices and regulations in the three Stock Exchange have 
been harmonised. A Capital Markets Development Committee has been established to 
oversee development of the capital markets, particularly cross-listing of stocks.  
 
In addition, progress have been made in a number of other fields such as confidence 
building measures and harmonisation of Partner States’ policies in the priority sectors; 
easing of border crossing; identification of various regional infrastructure projects; 
revival of regional co-operation in research; and human resource, science and 
technology development.  
 
EAC officials stress that a strong foundation has been laid for strategic partnership 
development with the rest of the continent. Close co-operation and co-ordination of 
activities take place with OAU, COMESA and SADC, among others.  
 
Conclusions 
As SADC turns its attention from co-operation towards integration, the overlaps with 
other groupings may become more problematic. Whereas overlaps in co-operation 
may entail waste of administrative resources, unclear and overlapping rules in the area 
of trade may retard economic progress in a more substantive way.   
 
All the non-SADC groupings described above have programmes that focus trade.  
However, since all countries within RIFF, IOC, and EAC (except Tanzania) are all 
members of COMESA and have adopted the COMESA trade integration framework, 
the more important overlap issue in the region is the relation between COMESA and 
SADC. By having SACU member countries joining the SADC FTA en bloc the 
possible problem of SACU has been solved although the differences in economic 
structure between South Africa and the BLNS may be problematic. 
 
The challenge for SADC will be to relate to the various overlapping integration and 
co-operation groupings in the region in such a way that its own efforts are not 
impaired and that it does not present obstacles for the other groupings. This may 
entail joint diplomatic efforts from SADC countries and occasionally place countries 
with overlapping memberships in difficult positions. 
 
3.8 Conclusion: A more relevant SADC? 
 
The team concluded in Ch. 2 that SADC’s institutional reforms are addressing the 
main weaknesses and shortcomings characterising SADC’s old structures. If 
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successfully implemented it will put the SADC institution in a position to facilitate 
increased regional co-operation and integration in the sub-region. 
 
In the final instance, however, an institution’s success depends on its work, on its 
performance in achieving its objectives. This chapter has reviewed and analysed 
SADC’s performance in several crucial areas. The conclusion calls for cautious 
optimism. A number of key issues and challenges have been identified. 
 
First, the team has noted that member countries have supported not only institutional 
reform, but also the efforts to develop and harmonise policies in a number of sectors. 
It is significant that SADC has been in position to do so in a period characterised by 
growing political divisions in the region. The lines of division within SADC appear to 
be crosscutting. Countries taking common positions relating to, e.g., defence issues, 
may take opposing or competing positions in, e.g., trade issues.  
 
Second, politics and shared history play an important role in tying SADC together. 
Many, but far from all countries, also benefit significantly in an economic way from 
the co-operation. Some recent member countries have mainly economic interests in 
joining and have limited political identity with SADC. One member country may 
have neither strong political or economic interests in SADC. On the other hand, 
countries, which today may have limited economic benefits from its membership, 
may become very important member countries in the future (e.g., Angola and DRC in 
relation to energy and water). This has important implications for SADC’s work. 
 
Thirdly, SADC must deliver. It must prioritise and focus its work with clear targets 
and timeframes. The SADC project is vulnerable and if the institution fails to deliver 
the project may also collapse.  
 
Fourthly, the team has noted that SADC in its current phase and with its emphasis on 
market integration has de-emphasised the importance of distribution of benefits. 
SADC must monitor the impact of its polices and help ensure that everybody gains 
from the membership. Member countries must have economic benefits and SADC’s 
efforts must also bring with it prospects of security and stability. It is also important 
that member countries get the assistance required to develop institutional capacities 
necessary to benefit from the membership. 
 
Fifthly, this study notes the overlap between a number of regional integration 
institutions. This presents administrative and institutional problems, particularly 
taking the weak capacities into account. With the shift to market integration this 
overlap may also create more substantial obstacles. The main overlap is the relation 
between Comesa and SADC. The introduction of free trade areas by both groupings 
requires the adoption of common external tariffs and identical structures.    
 
Sixthly, South Africa’s role is crucial for the success or failure of SADC. South Africa 
must take a leading role, contribute resources required to make it work and do it in a 
manner that does not increase tensions and divisions in the region. This also includes 
the utilisation of South Africa’s African Renaissance Fund and the implementation of 
Nepad. Foreign donors should encourage this through monitoring and dialogue. 
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Finally, the team concludes that SADC should not be expected to be able to make 
rapid progress in implementation and delivery in the short run. It will rather be an 
incremental process that will require time and astute management.      
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4: Conclusions and recommendations 
 
  
What then are the conclusions emerging from this review of the ongoing restructuring 
of SADC? Will the restructuring succeed? Will SADC be relevant for the 
achievement of future regional co-operation and integration in Southern Africa? Will 
SADC member countries support and implement SADC policies? 
 
The team interviewed over 70 senior officials, NGO and business representatives and 
other stakeholders in six Southern African countries. Most of those interviewed were 
also asked what they thought should be the most important thing that SADC should 
do. The team got a variety of responses and answers, but a concern with “delivery” 
and “enforcement” was a recurrent theme. Many also emphasised the importance of 
values rather than economic progress and delivery. It was also clear from the team’s 
interviews that SADC enjoyed a solid historical and political legitimacy. Several of 
those interviewed questioned the current organisation’s ability to make a difference 
that was felt among the people of the region and move beyond a “leadership club”. 
 
These responses capture some of the dilemmas SADC’s grapples with and the 
challenges that lie ahead. It is however, also important to emphasise that the ongoing 
restructuring and changes within SADC appear to have the support of the member 
states. Reservations and uncertainties were noted regarding the specifics of the 
phasing out of the sector co-ordinating units and commissions, but those interviewed 
showed support and commitment for the envisaged changes and displayed loyalty to 
the organisation and the decisions taken.   
 
It may therefore be concluded that SADC has the legitimacy and the potential to play 
the role envisaged. There are also uncertainties about the organisation’s ability to 
deliver. At the same time it also has to achieve both a deepening of economic co-
operation and integration and facilitate political stability and cohesion in the region. 
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A number of specific challenges can be identified. For SADC to succeed it has to 
address and find workable solutions to all of them. 
 
First, SADC needs to ensure a rapid completion of its institutional reforms. This 
implies not only a rapid phasing out of the old structures and the smooth functioning 
of a new centralised Secretariat. It includes finding solutions to a number of difficult 
issues, which currently remain unresolved. This includes the management of regional 
operational activities and implementation, and establishing and implementing a new 
formula for membership contributions to fund the new SADC institutions.  
 
Second, SADC needs to develop a focused approach to its development strategy and 
programme of action with an identification of targeted priorities for the medium term. 
It needs to prioritise its scarce resources and concentrate on its core business. SADC’s 
efficiency and focus can hardly be improved without a clear, prioritised and agreed 
plan for the organisation’s activities in the future. Such a plan will be important for 
member states’ common understanding of SADC’s future, for SADC citizens as well 
as for external donors. It will also be important as guidance for the Secretariat.  
Whereas the RISDP is of paramount importance for future success in delivery, the 
experience in preparing such plans is limited and the time allotted to the planning 
exercise extremely short. SADC will have to build on relevant experience from 
successes and pitfalls of national planning exercises and find ways to meet deadlines 
without impairing the quality of the planning process both in terms of communication, 
consensus building and the focus on delivery. 
 
Thirdly, SADC must continuously monitor the distribution of benefits of integration 
and co-operation between member countries. This assumes a particular importance in 
a region as diverse as Southern Africa. The gains from increased regional co-
operation must be widely spread in order to ensure that members to whom the 
immediate benefits are not obvious in the short to medium term remain committed to 
regionalisation. Trade liberalisation and the play of market forces may result in an 
enhancement of the advantaged position of more developed economies such as, and 
especially, South Africa and Mauritius, to the detriment of the other and especially the 
smaller, weaker ones of Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland, and to those such as Angola 
or DRC which has little to gain from the implementation of the trade protocol. 
      
Fourthly, SADC’s efforts to promote regional integration will not succeed solely on 
perceptions of economic costs and benefits in individual member countries. In the 
final analysis it is political will and commitment that will determine whether regional 
integration is embarked upon with serious intent. SADC’s efforts must bring with it 
not only prospects of prosperity but also of security and stability. In the current 
context this implies in particular an end to the war in the region, and a respect for the 
basic values of democracy, human rights and good governance.  
 
The obstacles ahead are significant. The member countries are highly uneven, the 
capacity to manage complex policy and technical issues are limited, the government is 
unstable and vulnerable in several member countries, and the political divisions on 
several key issues are manifest. Despite this the history of SADC also reveals a strong 
political commitment to the organisation and willingness to seek workable solutions. 
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This is perhaps most clearly evident in the efforts to negotiate and implement a trade 
protocol in the midst of the deep intra-regional political conflicts. 
 
The launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) may open up 
new opportunities also for SADC and regional co-operation in Southern Africa. 
Without a properly functioning SADC Nepad may simply not be able to deliver. 
Benefits for SADC are however not likely to materialise in the short-to-medium term 
and Nepad’s main impact may then primarily be related to the external environment 
and not on internal conditions in the region. The main danger lies in unintended 
consequences: a strong focus on Nepad and South Africa may lead to a situation 
where regional concerns are neglected and bypassed. This is already evident in some 
donor circles. 
 
The team would emphasise South Africa’s crucial role for advancing regional 
integration. South Africa should also be pro-active in this process, but this must be 
done in a way that does not increase tensions and divisions in the region. Further 
polarisation and marginalisation of weaker countries must be avoided and benefits 
must be distributed to ensure that all countries gain something from co-operation. 
This must also guide aid donors in their approach to South Africa and regional 
development. 
 
One should not expect that all 14 SADC member countries will progress in union 
towards a common goal. It is more likely that member countries that share common 
purposes and demonstrate the will and the ability to progress more swiftly will do so. 
Hence, what is sometimes referred to as “variable geometry and variable speed” is 
also likely to be a feature of the future evolution of SADC.  
 
The “southern core” of SADC – the members of the Customs Union – has reached a 
much higher level of economic integration than the rest. Combined with South 
Africa’s economic dominance this may lead to a situation where the SACU countries 
and others with accelerating economic ties to South Africa (especially Mozambique) 
may move more rapidly than the others. On the other extreme we find countries such 
as Angola and DRC and partly Tanzania with less direct and immediate economic 
benefits of accelerating the economic co-operation. Their commitment and policies 
will also depend much more on relations to countries outside SADC. Zimbabwe’s role 
is also crucial to the future evolution of SADC. Its economic position gives the 
country a key role to play in regional integration. The political crisis and economic 
meltdown in that country threatens to undermine progress in regional integration. It 
will seriously impact on the speed and nature of the SADC project. 
 
Cutting across these economic patterns is political allegiances and divisions. These 
have also seriously impacted and slowed down the speed of regional co-operation. 
Shared historical memories and political loyalties have, however, proved to be 
stronger and helped ensure that SADC has been able to move forward. These political 
ties and regional identities are one of SADC’s major assets and have helped ensure 
that the organisation and the regional project can move forward also in difficult times. 
However, these political ties are fragile and depend also on SADC’s ability to deliver.              
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4.1 Implications for Norwegian support 
 
Norway has been a firm financial and political supporter of SADC since its 
establishment as SADCC in 1980. Together with the other Nordic countries a special 
Nordic – SADCC Initiative was also established in the mid-1980s intending to provide 
a framework for an expanded economic co-operation as well as political dialogue 
between the two regions.1 
 
However, the co-operation began to falter in the 1990s and eventually the Initiative 
was formally dissolved in 1995. Norway has continued to fund projects in certain 
sectors, especially in natural resource management, environment and agriculture, but 
the direct communication between Norway and the SADC Secretariat had almost 
faded away by the late 1990s. 
 
Recognising the importance of regional co-operation Norway initiated a process to 
devise a new approach and operational guidelines for assistance to regional co-
operation and integration. Norwegian policy guidelines generally emphasise support 
to regional activities prioritising economic and political reform, contributions to peace 
and conflict management, and facilitation of increased economic integration and intra-
regional trade.  
 
In 2000 NORAD established a working group to formulate a strategy for Norwegian 
regional assistance to the SADC-region. This led to the adoption of set of guidelines 
in early 2001.2 In these guidelines economic development; energy; environment and 
natural resource management; peace, human rights and democracy; social sector; and 
culture are defined as the priority areas for Norwegian assistance to regional 
development in Southern Africa. A more focused programme will be established for 
assistance to SADC. This will include support for the institutional restructuring.    
 
The first manifestation of the new strategy was the allocation of NOK 10 million to 
the SADC Secretariat in mid-2001. This was as a contribution to the costs of 
implementing institutional reforms.3 This grant made Norway, according to the SADC 
Secretariat, the financially most important donor behind SADC’s 2001-2 
restructuring.4  
 
Below the team has identified the key implications of its assessment of SADC’s 
restructuring for a further operationalisation of NORAD’s assistance.  
 
   
                                                     
1 See more on this in Arne Tostensen et al., The Nordic/SADCC Initiative: A Nordic Review, Bergen: 
Chr. Michelsen Institute 1990 and Arne Tostensen & Keith Atkinson, Whither Nordic/SADC 
Relations? Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute 1996 (Report R 1996:6). 
2 Cf. Norwegian regional assistance to the SADC region. Report from the working group (in 
Norwegian), Unpublished report, NORAD 2001, and Guidelines for Norwegian Regional Assistance to 
Southern Africa, 28 February 2001 (in Norwegian), Unpublished, NORAD 2001. 
3 See Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (“Norad”) and the 
Secretariat for the Southern African Development Community (“SADC”) regarding financial 
assistance to the restructuring of the Southern African Development Community, Harare 24 July 2001. 
4 According to the information prepared by the SADC Secretariat for the Council of Ministers meeting 
in August 2001 the Norwegian grant accounted for over 80% of the foreign donor funding available to 
fund the institutional restructuring.    
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1: Prepare for flexibility and short-term assistance 
 
SADC will be spending a considerable portion of its time and energy on the 
institutional restructuring. It is important that this process is completed speedily and 
with a minimum of disruption to the implementation of programmes and projects. 
This has several implications for Norwegian financial assistance to SADC over the 
next couple of years. 
 
First, it may be required to provide additional financial support to the institutional 
restructuring. It is unlikely that SADC will be able to mobilise sufficient funding from 
member countries in the short to medium term. Such assistance will however, have to 
take into account support and priorities of other donors.  
 
Second, Norway should closely monitor programmes and projects currently supported 
and be prepared to offer assistance to ensure uninterrupted implementation of the 
activities in the transition phase. This includes also assistance to development and 
preparation of pipeline projects. 
 
Thirdly, Norway should refrain from proposing new initiatives and projects to be 
undertaken by SADC and its Secretariat. There is limited capacity within SADC 
structures to undertake additional tasks at this point.       
 
  
2: Build capacity for monitoring and analysis 
 
Pursuing regional co-operation in Southern Africa is a challenging and multifaceted 
process. It encompasses a range of different sectors, institutional reforms and capacity 
constraints, and sensitive political issues. This has implications for donors like 
Norway wishing to assist the process. An aid agency must have the capacity to 
monitor the co-operation and integration process and the activities of the wide range 
of actors involved. It must also be in a position to assess and analyse the implications 
of the unfolding events and processes. 
 
The appointment of a Councellor at the Norwegian embassy in Harare as a regional 
advisor is crucial to achieve proper monitoring and analysis. He or she must spend 
considerable time in Gaborone and also in the other SADC countries. With the overall 
co-ordination located with the Southern Africa Section at the NORAD Headquarters 
in Oslo it also important that NORAD has the capacity and competence to undertake 
this task. To facilitate both the work of the Councillor and NORAD’s Section for 
Southern African the team strongly recommends that the Norwegian resource milieu 
be mobilised to assist in this process.  
  
   
3: Guidelines for a Norwegian profile 
 
The team will make some recommendations for assistance in the medium to long-
term.  
 
First, it is important that the Norwegian assistance focuses on the core business of 
SADC which essentially revolves around economic integration (including 
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improvement of physical infrastructure) and support for peace and political stability in 
the region. SADC’s priorities as it emerges through the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan and the dialogue between Norway and SADC must inform and 
guide the selection of priority areas for support. Areas falling outside the prioritised 
core activities should not be actively pursued through SADC. Such areas should, 
when prioritised by NORAD, in stead be assisted at the national level or through other 
regional channels.   
 
Second, Norway must take into account areas and sectors where it has the skills and 
resources required to make a strong contribution. This may be an areas such as energy 
where it both has the professional and management skills within the aid agency and in 
the Norwegian resource milieu, and where the areas is also assisted through country 
programmes in the region. It is also recommended that areas also prioritised in the 
assistance to individual countries be selected.   
 
Thirdly, SADC needs to develop and strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity to co-
ordinate donor assistance to regional co-operation in the region. Norway should be 
prepared to offer its assistance in building this capacity within SADC. 
 
Fourthly, Norway must follow closely SADC’s efforts to facilitate conflict resolution 
and political stability in the region. The current Norwegian support to these areas is 
significant compared to the other regional assistance from Norway to Southern Africa. 
This assistance is however, largely ad hoc, uncoordinated and seemingly with little 
attention to what takes place at the regional level under the auspices of SADC (incl. 
associated organisations such as the Parliamentary Forum). The team expects, 
considering the nature of this area that a significant share of funding for such purposes 
still will have to be channelled outside official channels. 
 
Fifthly, South Africa’s role remains crucial to the progress and achievements of 
SADC. This must be reaffirmed in the Norwegian support to and co-operation with 
South Africa, including also Nepad. This implies that one should actively seek to 
make use of South Africa’s resources, institutional strengths and capacities both in the 
private and public sphere to facilitate regional co-operation. However, these resources 
must be used within a capacity-building context. It is important to avoid a situation 
where South Africa’s dominance may lead to deterioration in intra-regional relations 
with detrimental effect on regional co-operation. 
 
Sixthly, Norway should in its bilateral country programme support projects and 
activities that can strengthen national institutions and enable them to take part and 
benefit from regional co-operation, and reduce obstacles limiting implementation of, 
e.g., the trade protocol. The role of the SADC’s national committees in member 
countries should be closely monitored with a view to offer assistance if required. 
Norway should also prioritise sectors and projects where there is a potential that 
Norwegian assistance may help to mobilise investments from the private sector such 
as the spatial development initiatives.            
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Annex  
 
List of persons interviewed 
 
 Norway 
 
  Jon Lomøy, Head, Section for Southern Africa, Norad 
  Jan Einarsen, Section for Southern Africa, Norad 
  Frøydis Aarbakke, Section for Southern Africa, Norad 
  Øystein Glømmi, Technical Assistance Department, Norad  
 
Botswana: 
 
Scott Allen, Senior Policy Advisor, USAID Regional Centre for Southern Africa 
E. S. Mpofu, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
  Robert Kirk, Trade Advisor, SADC Secretariat 
Kennedy Mbekeani, Senior Research Fellow, Botswana Institute for Development 
Policy Analysis 
Ernst Gunnar Ring, Counsellor, Delegation of the European Commission in 
Botswana 
Tom Robert, Economic Advisor (Regional), Delegation of the European Commission 
in Botswana 
W. Aaron Tarver, Political/Economic Advisor, Embassy of the USA 
Alice Mogwe, Director, Ditshwanelo, The Botswana Centre for Human Rights 
Pamela Rodney, Ditshwanelo, The Botswana Centre for Human Rights 
Gaogakawe Phorano, Executive Secretary, Botswana Council of Non-Governmental 
Organisations 
Serwalo S. G. Tumelo, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning 
Wilfred Mandlebe, Deputy Secretary of Economics, Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning 
Tebelo Seretse, Minister of Trade, Industry, Wildlife and Tourism 
Mosadinyana G. Nthomiwa, Principal Commercial Officer (Foreign Trade), Ministry 
of Trade, Industry, Wildlife and Tourism 
A.E. Mondlane, Principal Economist, SADC Secretariat 
Dr. Pamacheche, Principal economist for trade integration, SADC Secretariat 
Balefi Tsie, Independent Electoral Commission and Department of Political Studies, 
University of Botswana  
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 Lesotho: 
 
Liengoane Lefosa, SADC Co-ordinator, Chief Economic Planner, Ministry of 
Development Planning 
Motlatsi Ramafole, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Pheko J. Makhetha, Director, Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Mr Mphale, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Mr Thoahlane, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Mr Kanetsti, Director, Department of Energy 
Mr Phuroe, Department of Energy 
Thuso N. Thokoa, Deputy Executive Secretary, Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
Simon Phafani, Vice-President, Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Lawrence Kolobere Ramoseou, Acting Director, SADC Water Sector Coordination 
Unit 
Staff, SADC Water Sector Coordination Unit 
Sehoai Santho, Independent Electoral Commission and the Lesotho Network for 
Conflict Management 
 
 Zimbabwe: 
 
  Arild Eik, Norwegian Ambassador, 
  Ingebjørg Støfring, Minister Councellor, Norway 
Emmie S. Wade, Deputy chief and knowledge networks co-ordinator, Southern 
Africa Sub-Regional Resource Facility, UNDP 
Vusumuzi Ntonga, SADC National Contact Point, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Frank J. Msuto, Head of Sub-Regional Bureau for Southern Africa, Interpol-
SARPCCO 
Reginald T. Mugware, Director, SADC Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources 
Sector Development Unit 
Howard K. Sigwele, Co-ordinator, Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy 
Analysis Network 
Brian A. C. Raftopoulos, Associate Professor, Institute of Development Studies 
Martin Rupiya, Director, Centre for Defence Studies 
Wilson Chapata, Trade Economist, Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries 
Sam Mutanhaurwa, Principal Administrative Officer, External Trade 
Division/Regional Organisations, Ministry of Trade and Commerce 
Barbara P. Seremwe, Senior Administrative Officer, External Trade 
Division/Regional Organisations, Ministry of Trade and Commerce 
James Jowa, Depty Chief Economist, Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce 
 
 Tanzania: 
 
Margo James Kassaja, Assistant Director, SADC Industry and Trade Co-ordination 
Division 
Zakaria J. Masanja, Principal Industrial Economist, SADC Industry and Trade Co-
ordination Division 
Mary Mwingira, Executive Director, Tanzania Association for Non-governmental 
organisations 
Prof. Amani, Senior Research fellow, Economic and Social Research Foundation 
Per Olaf Svarvar, Executive Co-director, Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry 
and Agriculture 
Tone Tinnes, resident economist, Norwegian embassy 
 
 South Africa: 
     
Wiseman L. Nkuhlu, Economic Advisor, the Presidency 
Phemelo Marishane, Deputy Director, International Financial Relations, National 
Treasury 
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Muzi Khumalo, Economist, Regional Integration Unit, International Financial 
Relations, National Treasury 
H. Pringle, Economic Policy, International Financial Relations, National Treasury 
Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Public and 
Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand 
Gavin Cawthra, Director, Centre for Defence and Security Management, Graduate 
School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand 
Jon Bech, Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy 
Katja Nordbø, Minister Councellor, Norwegian Embassy 
Steinar Hagen, Councellor, Norwegian Embassy 
Svein Baera, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy 
Sifiso Ngwenya, Director, Southern Africa/SADC, Department of Trade and Industry 
Liezel Castleman, Sub-Directorate: Social Programmes, Chief Directorate: Africa, 
Multilateral Department, Department of Foreign Affairs; 
Ajay Bramdeo, Sub-Directorate: Security, Chief Directorate: Africa, Multilateral 
Department, Department of Foreign Affairs; 
Siyabulela Tsengiwe, Sub-Directorate: Trade, Finance and Investment, Chief 
Directorate: Africa, Multilateral Department, Department of Foreign Affairs; 
Leanna Hattingh, Nordic Desk, Department of Foreign Affairs  
   
 Angola 
 
Joao S. Caholo, Director, Technical Unit, Energy Commission (interviewed in South 
Africa) 
Euclides Morais de Brito, Technical assistant to the Director, Technical Unit, Energy 
Commission (interviewed in South Africa) 
Rui Jorge Carneiro Mangueira, Director, Economic and Regional Integration 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Jose P. da C. Barroso Mangueira, International Coordinator, Ministry of Petroleum 
Eleuterio Verrissiomo C. Mavela, Ministry of Petroleum 
Franscisco Talino, National Director of Energy, Ministry of Energy and Water 
Harald Ekker, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy  
Bjørg Leite, Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy 
Joao Lusivikueno, Director, Department of International Exchange, Ministry of 
Trade 
Mbumba Chico, Head of Multilateral Trade Relations Department, Ministry of Trade 
Francisco Tunga Alberto, Secretary General, Forum of Angolan NGOs (Fonga) and 
other Fonga representatives 
Abel Fonseca, National Director, Water Resources, Ministry of Energy and Water 
Affairs  
 
 
 
 
 Summary 
 
This study was commissioned by Norad. The Report provides 
an assessment of the institutional restructuring of SADC and 
an input to the planning of future Norwegian assistance to 
regional co-operation in Southern Africa.  
 
The institutional reforms mainly revolve around the changing 
role and functions of the SADC Secretariat but also include 
the sector co-ordinating units in member states which have 
been found highly uneven in their ability to pursue and 
implement policies; the establishment of SADC National 
Committees in member countries; greater emphasis on the 
role of non-state actors;  a SADC Organ on Politics, Defence  
and Security which became part of the SADC structure;  and 
the preparation of a Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP) intended to make SADC’s 
objectives more operational. The report finds the reforms 
major and significant steps to address the weaknesses 
associated with the old SADC structure.   
 
It is found significant that SADC has managed to make 
progress in several policy areas despite political divisions in 
the Southern African region. Looking at the future, the report 
concludes that it will be important to ensure that all member 
countries benefit from the membership to some degree; 
points out that regional integration will not succeed only on 
perceptions of economic costs and benefits in individual 
member countries but also depends on political will and 
commitment; argues that the RISDP is extremely important 
for the future success in delivery and creation of a common 
understanding of SADC’s role; emphasises South Africa’s 
crucial role in advancing regional co-operation; and finds that 
overlapping regional integration efforts in Southern Africa, 
like the relation between SADC and Comesa, may become 
more problematic with the move to economic integration. 
SADC should not be expected to make rapid progress in 
implementation and delivery in the short run. Progress will 
rather be an incremental process that will require time and 
astute management.  
 
Norway must be prepared for continued flexibility and short-
term assistance in its support, and build capacity for 
monitoring and analysis. In the medium to long-term, 
Norwegian support should focus on SADC’s core areas of 
operations. Norway should follow closely SADC’s efforts to 
facilitate conflict resolution and political stability and, in its 
assistance to individual SADC member countries, support 
projects and programmes that enable the countries to benefit 
from regional co-operation. 
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